Warrior Ancient and Medieval Rules

[Bill Low]

1. Given the few hard facts left to us from the wreck of the
Classical world, it is often necessary to rely on inference, analogy
and probability in order to derive a coherent narrative of military
events or developments. In assessing alternative interpretations,
it is often tempting to engage in "wargamer logic" … reasoning that
is more result-oriented advocacy than balanced and well-considered
reconstruction … but always a mistake. The best remedy for this
mistaken approach is to get as close to the sources as we can, and
maintain awareness of what's original and what's just inference.

2. The original post in this thread cites the account set forth
in Nick Sekunda's Osprey booklet on the Achaemenid Persian army as
if it were a clear and undisputed primary source. It is neither; it
is, rather, a clever and imaginative reconstruction of a few bits
and pieces known about the development of the Iphicratean reforms
and the later career of that general, filling in the gaps with
inference and supposition.

3. Sekunda says as much (speaking generally about the poor
state of sources on Persian military history generally, but equally
applicable here) in his introduction on page 3 of the Osprey
booklet: "… what follows must be regarded as a personal, and
provisional, interpretation of the evidence."

4. The reality is that no one really knows when the reforms
were instituted, exactly why and under what circumstances, or even
that the attribution to Iphicrates is entirely correct. It is
perhaps more likely that the process was a gradual one, with
elements falling into place at different times and places.

5. There is no reasonably contemporary account of the reforms,
the only direct sources being the much later Diodorus Siculus and,
of lesser interest, Cornelius Nepos, neither of which provides much
detail.

6. H.W. Parke, in his Greek Mercenary Soldiers from the
Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus, pp. 77-81, sets out a more
nuanced (and almost certainly more accurate) statement of the case.
He notes that the translation of the pertinent passage suggests that
Diodorus at least believed that Iphicrates instituted the reforms
after the Egyptian campaign by drawing on the lessons learned in
that experience. ("He [Iphicrates] having acquired additional and
lengthy experience of all military matters in the Persian war made
many inventions, which were of military value, and was particularly
renowned for those to do with equipment.")

7. G.K. Anderson, Military Theory and Practice in the Age of
Xenophon, p. 129 (but cf. p. 130), appears for the most part to
agree with Parke, while wargamer Luke Ueda-Sarson, in two articles
on The Evolution of Hellenistic Infantry, published in Slingshot 222
(May 2002), pp.30-36, and 223 (July 2002), pages 23-28, actually
argues that the ideas came to Iphicrates as a result of his facing
similarly-armed Egyptian marines and were first tested on Greek
epibatai … hoplites serving as marines … specifically for naval
warfare.

8. Actually, the Iphicratean "reforms" involved significant
improvements in morale, discipline and esprit de corps, as well as
improved equipment, and these "reforms" were already well-advanced
long before Pharnabazus' campaign against Egypt in 374 BC.
Iphicrates had reformed his mercenary peltasts in this sense, though
still armed in traditional style, as early as the Corinthian War,
when they destroyed a Spartan mora at Lechaion in 390 BC.

9. More telling perhaps is the account of the behavior of the
peltasts of Chabrias (a rival Athenian mercenary commander and
condottiere in the period), in one instance facing down the Spartan
king Agesilaos. Chabrias' peltasts appear to have been drawn up in
good order on higher ground, and on his command dropped to one knee,
propping their shields against the other knee and grounding their
spears to receive the enemy's charge. Agesilaos, surprised and
disheartened by their discipline and good order, withdrew his
hoplite force without attacking. This account is perfectly
consistent with well-trained and motivated mercenaries armed in
the "new" manner, and utterly incomprehensible if applied to
traditional light-armed peltasts. However, this incident occurred
in 378 BC, four years before the Egyptian campaign.

10. In short, on the historical record, it is perfectly possible
that Iphicrates did invent or adapt the new equipment based on his
experiences in Persian service, and that he instituted his reforms
at the time of or shortly after the Egyptian campaign. However, it
is by no means certain that he did so and some of the best sources
we have suggest that he did not. It cannot in any event be said
that they were "originated" by the Persians or that they had any
special connection to the Persian military.

11. (If there is a foreign connection, it is more likely to be
with Thrace; Iphicrates was a son-in-law of Cotys, king of the
Odrysian Thracians, and fought a number of campaigns in that
region. Thracian peltasts were capable of fighting in loose order
with long spears as well as javelins.)

12. What then does all this have to do with the argument in the
original post? First, it cannot be maintained with the original
post that "the Iphicratean hoplite was originated and first used by
the Persians" (or in the follow-up post that the Persians were
the "originators" of the troop type). The training, tactics and
motivation of a Greek condottiere cannot be attributed so loosely
to "the Persians," nor can one make the logical jump to some
inferential special connection between the Persian military and the
reformed Iphicrateans.

13. Second, there is no sufficient basis to assume that
Iphricrates reformed all or any particular portion of the non-
hoplite Greek mercenaries available to Pharnabazos for the Egyptian
campaign, and thus no good basis for the argument comparing the
number of elements allowed by the Later Achaemenid list to a number
of Iphicrateans presumed to be engaged in the campaign.

14. (The original post compounds that error by misrepresenting
the number of elements allowed in CW #6, Early Thracian, to
represent the Ten Thousand, asserting that 24 elements are there
allowed to represent 10,000 men. This is incorrect. Only 12
elements of the total 24 elements of Greek Hoplites may be upgraded
to Reg B to represent the ex-Cyreans.)

15. The follow-up post criticizes the "paltry" number of
Iphicratean Hoplites available in the Later Achaemenid list and
makes the argument more explicitly that Greek mercenaries should be
numerous enough to make up the bulk (and at least half) of a Later
Achaemenid infantry force. In fact, they are. The Later Achaemenid
list allows 24 elements of Greek Mercenary Hoplites, plus a further
36 elements of Ionian Greeks (if that is how you want to bring them,
as opposed to Egyptians or native Kardaka), on top of the
Iphicratean Hoplites (and in addition to the 24 elements of
Takabara), for a remarkable 68 elements or 272 Greek mercenary
hoplites (traditional and reformed) in Persian service … far more,
if you took them all, than you could ever afford at the usual point
cost and certainly all the infantry you would need for a standard
sized army.

16. One could go further, and question whether all of the newly-
equipped former peltasts available for Pharnabazos' Egyptian
campaign were sufficiently confident and well-trained to take
advantage of their greater mobility, rather than behaving more like
traditionally-armed hoplites.

17. But at a certain point you have to call a halt to the
speculation. The questions are endless, and many answerless.
Demanding that level of detail is to press the sources too far, and
really to miss the point. As has been pointed out on the Group
already, the number of elements in a list is generally not based on
any particular number of troops at any particular time or place, but
rather on the basis of overall proportions of the whole and a sense
of what the army should look like during the period covered by the
list.

18. Overall, the number and types of Greek mercenaries allowed
in the Later Achaemenid list appears to be reasonable and correct
for our purposes.

[Ewan McNay]

On Tue, 12 Jul 2005, tabletop06897 wrote:

<gratuitous snip of entire post>

Hey, Bill, quit hiding behind that alias and pseudo-ID ;-P.

Moderator, I suggest that he be punished by being forced to write many
more posts in such vein on such topics as the group populace at large may
demand .

the mysterious shadow.

[Bill Chriss]

The response of Lowclan/FHE partially copied below is PRECISELY what I was
talking about in my reply to chargeholio's questions about the
Iphicrateans represented in the Persian lists. I am quite simply unaware
of an equivalent level of scholarship and thoughtfulness given to similar
questions by any other game designer, particularly a miniatures game
designer. As I said then, I wasn't sure WHAT the justification for that
paricular list judgment was, but I WAS sure that a well-considered and
entirely defensible such justification did exist. I find this sort of
question and answer both educational and indicative of the extrememly high
quality of the game/simulation system we have been provided.


Greek





> 1. Given the few hard facts left to us from the wreck of the
> Classical world, it is often necessary to rely on inference, analogy
> and probability in order to derive a coherent narrative of military
> events or developments. In assessing alternative interpretations,
> it is often tempting to engage in &quot;wargamer logic&quot; … reasoning
> that
> is more result-oriented advocacy than balanced and well-considered
> reconstruction … but always a mistake. The best remedy for this
> mistaken approach is to get as close to the sources as we can, and
> maintain awareness of what's original and what's just inference.
>
> 2. The original post in this thread cites the account set forth
> in Nick Sekunda's Osprey booklet on the Achaemenid Persian army as
> if it were a clear and undisputed primary source. It is neither; it
> is, rather, a clever and imaginative reconstruction of a few bits
> and pieces known about the development of the Iphicratean reforms
> and the later career of that general, filling in the gaps with
> inference and supposition.
snip
> 4. The reality is that no one really knows when the reforms
> were instituted, exactly why and under what circumstances, or even
> that the attribution to Iphicrates is entirely correct. It is
> perhaps more likely that the process was a gradual one, with
> elements falling into place at different times and places.
>
> 5. There is no reasonably contemporary account of the reforms,
> the only direct sources being the much later Diodorus Siculus and,
> of lesser interest, Cornelius Nepos, neither of which provides much
> detail.
>
>


snip

> 10. In short, on the historical record, it is perfectly possible
> that Iphicrates did invent or adapt the new equipment based on his
> experiences in Persian service, and that he instituted his reforms
> at the time of or shortly after the Egyptian campaign. However, it
> is by no means certain that he did so and some of the best sources
> we have suggest that he did not. It cannot in any event be said
> that they were &quot;originated&quot; by the Persians or that they had
> any
> special connection to the Persian military.
>
> 11. (If there is a foreign connection, it is more likely to be
> with Thrace; Iphicrates was a son-in-law of Cotys, king of the
> Odrysian Thracians, and fought a number of campaigns in that
> region. Thracian peltasts were capable of fighting in loose order
> with long spears as well as javelins.)
snip

>
> 14. (The original post compounds that error by misrepresenting
> the number of elements allowed in CW #6, Early Thracian, to
> represent the Ten Thousand, asserting that 24 elements are there
> allowed to represent 10,000 men. This is incorrect. Only 12
> elements of the total 24 elements of Greek Hoplites may be upgraded
> to Reg B to represent the ex-Cyreans.)
>
> 15. The follow-up post criticizes the &quot;paltry&quot; number of
> Iphicratean Hoplites available in the Later Achaemenid list and
> makes the argument more explicitly that Greek mercenaries should be
> numerous enough to make up the bulk (and at least half) of a Later
> Achaemenid infantry force. In fact, they are. The Later Achaemenid
> list allows 24 elements of Greek Mercenary Hoplites, plus a further
> 36 elements of Ionian Greeks (if that is how you want to bring them,
> as opposed to Egyptians or native Kardaka), on top of the
> Iphicratean Hoplites (and in addition to the 24 elements of
> Takabara), for a remarkable 68 elements or 272 Greek mercenary
> hoplites (traditional and reformed) in Persian service … far more,
> if you took them all, than you could ever afford at the usual point
> cost and certainly all the infantry you would need for a standard
> sized army.
>
> 16. One could go further, and question whether all of the newly-
> equipped former peltasts available for Pharnabazos' Egyptian
> campaign were sufficiently confident and well-trained to take
> advantage of their greater mobility, rather than behaving more like
> traditionally-armed hoplites.
>
> 17. But at a certain point you have to call a halt to the
> speculation. The questions are endless, and many answerless.
> Demanding that level of detail is to press the sources too far, and
> really to miss the point. As has been pointed out on the Group
> already, the number of elements in a list is generally not based on
> any particular number of troops at any particular time or place, but
> rather on the basis of overall proportions of the whole and a sense
> of what the army should look like during the period covered by the
> list.
>
> 18. Overall, the number and types of Greek mercenaries allowed
> in the Later Achaemenid list appears to be reasonable and correct
> for our purposes.
>
>
>

[Craig Scott]

Hi Bill et al,

Iphicrates was a Persian general as much, if not more, as an Athenian
or any other city state mercenary. His formative years were with the
Persian services. Just as their were Babylonians, Phoenicians, other
Greeks, etc. in the service of the empire. Skudra (Thrace) was
controlled by Persia for almost two generations, so what. Military
application went back and forth; light troops began showing up in
earnest after Xerxes' failure in Greece, cavalry began to improve
also for the Greeks. At least a myriads worth of non-greek takabara
(since it has been
deemed important) were armed with 12 ft. spears also. If you don't
want give
them benefit of the doubt fine. I already disagree with the LTS for
the Takabara, except for the possibility after the King's Peace 387
BC anyway and I will not use them.

You are actually too generous with the Greek mercenary hoplites (18
elements recommended), 24 elements of Ionian/Kardaka is sufficient (o;

**Folks from our earlier e-mails to put this in some context.Please
read them carefully and forgive the typos**

-----Original Message-----
From: Craigshar [mailto:craigshar@...]
Sent: Tuesday, July 12, 2005 8:00 PM
To: 'Bill Low'
Cc: **removed for privacy**
Subject: RE: Iphricates trained Takabara

Hi Bill,

Yes, you understood me correctly as Iphicrates was given instruction
by the Persian (Pharnabazos, etc.) admirals and generals. Starting
his military career in the service of Artaxerxes II as a young lad
and participating in the decisive naval victory at Cnidius when he
had just reached his 18th year. Pharnabazos had known Iphicrates most
of his life and were good and trusted friends. Look Persian generals
led Greek troops as were Greek generals leading Persian troops.
Iphicrates was directly leading at least two myriads one which was
made up of entirely Persian troops and proved the decisive factor in
flanking and taking the initial Egyptian defenses.
This is one of the reasons why I don't like to touch interim
development of troop types. The Takabara with LTS is an intermediate
step to the Kardaka phalanxes of the royal army, further aided by
Datames' development whom was there also. Military sciences when back
and forth, Athens and Sparta at this time are puppets of the Great
King, access to political and military resources were at the empire's
calling.
Pharnabazos / Iphicrates took a long time to setup this (longer than
Xerxes' to invade Greece) invasion, the empire's military bureaucracy
standardized weapons, food stuffs, heck paper records, etc, another
words years of counsel and training... again if we are going to have
the LTS option than the Greek infantry rule # 1 should apply.

I will be bringing a 25mm & 15 mm late Ach army for the theme, any of
you are welcome to use my 15mm army for the theme (o: Be well all!!

Warmest regards,

Craig



-----Original Message-----
From: Bill Low [mailto:BLOW@...]
Sent: Tuesday, July 12, 2005 10:42 AM
To: craigshar@...
Cc: Scott.Holder@...
Subject: RE: Iphricates trained Takabara

Thanks, Craig, for the prompt reply. Esp. welcome given how close we
are to H'con.

The two sources you cite talk about Iphicrates as a commander in the
Persian force assembled for the Egyptian campaign, and the Sekunda
passage (which has some issues) talks about retraining non-Hoplite
Greek mercenaries. I had understood your earlier comment to relate
to Iphicrates training non-Greek takabara (rather than Greek
peltasts). Was I mistaken?

Regards.


>>> "Craigshar" <craigshar@...> 07/11/05 10:25 PM >>>
Hi Bill,

Yes indeed here are a couple sources for now:

The Cambridge History of Iran volume 2, chapter 6 Persia and the
Greeks,
Section IV. Rebels and Mercenaries (386-334B.C), I. Reconquest of
Cyprus;
Failure in Egypt Pg. 371 Paragraph 2
"Pharnabazos was about to prepare, with Tithraustes, another attack on
Egypt, and the King posted Datames to their general staff (our source
actually says, to an equal share in the command) ;2 but he, whose
successes
were all won by speed and daring, must have found the experience
frustrating. Tithraustes disappears from the scene; perhaps, in old
age, he
retired to estates in central Asia Minor, where there is mention, as
late as
356, of €  '³Tithraustes€  '² country€  '´.
Pharnabazos began with a
diplomatic
success.
He protested to Athens about Chabrias€  '² presence in Egypt
as €  '³alienating the
King€  '²s goodwill towards the people€  '´; and Athens in
a fright
sent him a
peremptory message of recall, (He was home in time to be elected a
general
at Athens for At the same time Pharnabazos requested and received the
loan
of Athens€  '² most famous commander, Iphikrates, a specialist
in the
latest
tactics and a hero of the Greek wars. But for the formidable task
before
him, Pharnabazos was determined this time to leave nothing to chance."

By A.R. Burn

The Persian Army 560-330BC Osprey
The reforms of Iphicrates, section pg 27 Para. 2 & 3
"In order to remedy these deficiencies Iphicrates conceived the idea
of
creating an €  '±Iphicratean peltast€  '² who could fight
in the
front line
and
stand up to hoplites. Essentially he was converting the 12,000 non-
hoplite
Greek mercenaries into takabara, but further strengthening their
equipment.
His troops were given a taka, or pelt* as our Greek sources describe
it,
which Diodorus (15.44) mentions as being equal in size to the hoplite
shield. The fighting spear was lengthened by half, from the normal 8-
foot
spear used by hoplites and takabara alike, to a 12€  '·foot pike.
These
12,000
troops were known as €  '±Iphicrateans€  '² after their
general and
creator.
The invasion fleet finally set sail for Egypt in 373 BC, but the
invasion
was a disaster. Pharnabazus, now an old man, refused to take decisions
without referring them to the King for approval, and the initiative
was
lost. Iphicrates€  '² enemies in the army started plotting
against
him
again;
eventually the wily Athenian slipped back to Athens in the hold of a
ship,
and his army of mercenaries disintegrated. The €  
'±Iphicrateans€  '²,
however, had
proved themselves on the field of battle, and the Persian-inspired
€  '±Iphicratean peltast€  '² now became a feature of
warfare on the
Greek"

By Nick Sekunda

I will have much more later, after the convention. Following up on my
earlier correspondences to Scott with copious documentations on the
Achaemenid lists and remember I am against the LTS for the Takabara.
I have
much, much more documentation for changes needed in the troops
involved
under the banners of the "King of Kings". But if you are going to
have the
LTS than the Greek infantry rule # 1 should apply. Again looking
forward
seeing everyone next week and be well all.

Sincerely,
Craig


-----Original Message-----
From: Bill Low [mailto:BLOW@...]
Sent: Monday, July 11, 2005 2:02 PM
To: craigshar@...
Cc: Scott.Holder@...
Subject: Re: Iphricates trained Takabara

Hey, Craig. Saw your email, and the reference to Iphicrates having
trained
takabara. Do you have a source for me on that? A prompt reply would
be
appreciated. Thanks.

>>> "Craigshar" <craigshar@...> 07/11/05 7:34 AM >>>
Hi Scott,


Looking forward to seeing you all next week! You know I already
disagree
with the LTS for the Takabara, except for the possibility after the
King's
Peace 387 BC. The Persian general (more on this later) Iphricates
personally
trained the Takabara, we know this. Please allow Greek Infantry rule
#1 for
the Taka with LTS, it seems strange that the guy started a new class
of
infantry and that trained in person these troops don't get his
function...
They should still waver test if receiving mounted charge in the open.

Iphricatids, Hypaspists (loose order) in the open charged in the
flank or
rear should still waver at their respective morale.

This could not wait before the convention. Thank you and be well.

Warmest regards,

Craig Scott

[Kelly Wilkinson]

Hi Bill, My comments will be written after each of your points below.

tabletop06897 <lowclan@...> wrote:
1. Given the few hard facts left to us from the wreck of the
Classical world, it is often necessary to rely on inference, analogy
and probability in order to derive a coherent narrative of military
events or developments. In assessing alternative interpretations,
it is often tempting to engage in "wargamer logic" … reasoning that
is more result-oriented advocacy than balanced and well-considered
reconstruction … but always a mistake. The best remedy for this
mistaken approach is to get as close to the sources as we can, and
maintain awareness of what's original and what's just inference.

Kelly--

My question for this is how one comes up with the random number of 8 elements
for Iphicratean Hoplites as allowed by the Later Acheamenid List in CW. Further,
how does one speculate that the Saite Egyptians, who were a Persian satrapy in
rebellion, can have 24 elements of the afforementioned troops? If these troops
are available throught the periods of instability for the rebels, then why
aren't they available in the same numbers for the Loyalists/Persians?

2. The original post in this thread cites the account set forth
in Nick Sekunda's Osprey booklet on the Achaemenid Persian army as
if it were a clear and undisputed primary source. It is neither; it
is, rather, a clever and imaginative reconstruction of a few bits
and pieces known about the development of the Iphicratean reforms
and the later career of that general, filling in the gaps with
inference and supposition.

Kelly--

Go back and read the post again. Osprey is quoted and nowhere is there any
statement that this is an original source. But Osprey does site at least several
historical references which I doubt are supposition. As far as inferncial data,
this is what get from being dabblers in history.

3. Sekunda says as much (speaking generally about the poor
state of sources on Persian military history generally, but equally
applicable here) in his introduction on page 3 of the Osprey
booklet: "… what follows must be regarded as a personal, and
provisional, interpretation of the evidence."

Kelly--

You are correct, but Iphicrates and his deeds are recorded by "Greek" sources
rather than that of Persian sources which are the subject of Sekunda's comments.
Further read the section again and it is Greek sources that are noted. Diodorus
specifically in the section.

4. The reality is that no one really knows when the reforms
were instituted, exactly why and under what circumstances, or even
that the attribution to Iphicrates is entirely correct. It is
perhaps more likely that the process was a gradual one, with
elements falling into place at different times and places.

Kelly--

Perhaps this is so, but it seems that it is a given that it did occur and this
reform allowed to more than one army in CW. Additionally as Craig Scott has
already stated, reforms in Greek Warfare always infected the Persian military
considering their widespread use of "Greek troops."



5. There is no reasonably contemporary account of the reforms,
the only direct sources being the much later Diodorus Siculus and,
of lesser interest, Cornelius Nepos, neither of which provides much
detail.

Kelly--

Nonetheless FHE must feel that the evidence is sufficient otherwise, it would
not have been included in CW.



6. H.W. Parke, in his Greek Mercenary Soldiers from the
Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus, pp. 77-81, sets out a more
nuanced (and almost certainly more accurate) statement of the case.
He notes that the translation of the pertinent passage suggests that
Diodorus at least believed that Iphicrates instituted the reforms
after the Egyptian campaign by drawing on the lessons learned in
that experience. ("He [Iphicrates] having acquired additional and
lengthy experience of all military matters in the Persian war made
many inventions, which were of military value, and was particularly
renowned for those to do with equipment.")

Kelly--

Would this be the same book that Mr. Parke authored in 1933? I read that one
during my Officer Basic course at Fort Sill. But that is only Parke's opinion
which makes this a Parke verses Sekunda opinion and not more accurate.

7. G.K. Anderson, Military Theory and Practice in the Age of
Xenophon, p. 129 (but cf. p. 130), appears for the most part to
agree with Parke, while wargamer Luke Ueda-Sarson, in two articles
on The Evolution of Hellenistic Infantry, published in Slingshot 222
(May 2002), pp.30-36, and 223 (July 2002), pages 23-28, actually
argues that the ideas came to Iphicrates as a result of his facing
similarly-armed Egyptian marines and were first tested on Greek
epibatai … hoplites serving as marines … specifically for naval
warfare.

8. Actually, the Iphicratean "reforms" involved significant
improvements in morale, discipline and esprit de corps, as well as
improved equipment, and these "reforms" were already well-advanced
long before Pharnabazus' campaign against Egypt in 374 BC.
Iphicrates had reformed his mercenary peltasts in this sense, though
still armed in traditional style, as early as the Corinthian War,
when they destroyed a Spartan mora at Lechaion in 390 BC.



9. More telling perhaps is the account of the behavior of the
peltasts of Chabrias (a rival Athenian mercenary commander and
condottiere in the period), in one instance facing down the Spartan
king Agesilaos. Chabrias' peltasts appear to have been drawn up in
good order on higher ground, and on his command dropped to one knee,
propping their shields against the other knee and grounding their
spears to receive the enemy's charge. Agesilaos, surprised and
disheartened by their discipline and good order, withdrew his
hoplite force without attacking. This account is perfectly
consistent with well-trained and motivated mercenaries armed in
the "new" manner, and utterly incomprehensible if applied to
traditional light-armed peltasts. However, this incident occurred
in 378 BC, four years before the Egyptian campaign.

Kelly---

Cool. 8 and 9 disagree with 6 and 7. It's good to see that your unbiased as
usual.

10. In short, on the historical record, it is perfectly possible
that Iphicrates did invent or adapt the new equipment based on his
experiences in Persian service, and that he instituted his reforms
at the time of or shortly after the Egyptian campaign. However, it
is by no means certain that he did so and some of the best sources
we have suggest that he did not. It cannot in any event be said
that they were "originated" by the Persians or that they had any
special connection to the Persian military.

Kelly---

Actually we are back to the opinion game of various Authors and what they
interpret to be Cornelius Nepos and Diodorus Siculus were thinking. But more
importantly to this game is that FHE believes that these reforms are Iphicratean
as this is what this troop type is called in CW. I suppose that When
he(Iphicrates) instituted his changes is of lesser importance. But it is
historical record that he did train and lead such troops for Persia which,if I'm
not mistaken, Craig Scott believes becomes the blueprint for the later Takabara
and is another conversation altogether.


11. (If there is a foreign connection, it is more likely to be
with Thrace; Iphicrates was a son-in-law of Cotys, king of the
Odrysian Thracians, and fought a number of campaigns in that
region. Thracian peltasts were capable of fighting in loose order
with long spears as well as javelins.)

12. What then does all this have to do with the argument in the
original post? First, it cannot be maintained with the original
post that "the Iphicratean hoplite was originated and first used by
the Persians" (or in the follow-up post that the Persians were
the "originators" of the troop type). The training, tactics and
motivation of a Greek condottiere cannot be attributed so loosely
to "the Persians," nor can one make the logical jump to some
inferential special connection between the Persian military and the
reformed Iphicrateans.

Kelly---

I can agree with this. But then again, contemporary historians seem to disagree
when this reform actually took place.

13. Second, there is no sufficient basis to assume that
Iphricrates reformed all or any particular portion of the non-
hoplite Greek mercenaries available to Pharnabazos for the Egyptian
campaign, and thus no good basis for the argument comparing the
number of elements allowed by the Later Achaemenid list to a number
of Iphicrateans presumed to be engaged in the campaign.

Kelly---

Okay Bill, help me understand how you came up with the figure of 8 elements
being available for the Persian Empire verses that of 24 for their Rebellious
Satrapy? One thought that comes to mind is that the Egyptians aquired many of
theirs from the 12,000 man force that disentigrated upon Iphicrate's departure.
That is just my suppostion. What is your thinking on this?

14. (The original post compounds that error by misrepresenting
the number of elements allowed in CW #6, Early Thracian, to
represent the Ten Thousand, asserting that 24 elements are there
allowed to represent 10,000 men. This is incorrect. Only 12
elements of the total 24 elements of Greek Hoplites may be upgraded
to Reg B to represent the ex-Cyreans.)

Kelly---

Great, then taking the fact that the force that Iphicrates trained and led into
Pharabazzus' campaign was 12,000, one could extrapolate 14 or 16 elements?

15. The follow-up post criticizes the "paltry" number of
Iphicratean Hoplites available in the Later Achaemenid list and
makes the argument more explicitly that Greek mercenaries should be
numerous enough to make up the bulk (and at least half) of a Later
Achaemenid infantry force. In fact, they are. The Later Achaemenid
list allows 24 elements of Greek Mercenary Hoplites, plus a further
36 elements of Ionian Greeks (if that is how you want to bring them,
as opposed to Egyptians or native Kardaka), on top of the
Iphicratean Hoplites (and in addition to the 24 elements of
Takabara), for a remarkable 68 elements or 272 Greek mercenary
hoplites (traditional and reformed) in Persian service … far more,
if you took them all, than you could ever afford at the usual point
cost and certainly all the infantry you would need for a standard
sized army.

Kelly---

This is certainly true. But one could simply not add to the total numbers and
merely make it an *option* to make a portion of the total Merc force as
Iphicritid hoplites.

16. One could go further, and question whether all of the newly-
equipped former peltasts available for Pharnabazos' Egyptian
campaign were sufficiently confident and well-trained to take
advantage of their greater mobility, rather than behaving more like
traditionally-armed hoplites.

Kelly---

You could argue that, but considering that they were trained and led by the
"master" Iphicrates and successfully employed, this would most likely be
incorrect. But hey, anything can be argued in history as everybody has their own
opinion. But consider this, does it really matter if Iphicrates lead this style
of hoplite? If they were readily available for the Egyptians, it would seem that
the even deeper pockets of the Persian empire could afford the same numbers and
why not? Just looking at the numbers of available hoplites seems to agree.

17. But at a certain point you have to call a halt to the
speculation. The questions are endless, and many answerless.
Demanding that level of detail is to press the sources too far, and
really to miss the point. As has been pointed out on the Group
already, the number of elements in a list is generally not based on
any particular number of troops at any particular time or place, but
rather on the basis of overall proportions of the whole and a sense
of what the army should look like during the period covered by the
list.

Kelly---

See my point above.

18. Overall, the number and types of Greek mercenaries allowed
in the Later Achaemenid list appears to be reasonable and correct
for our purposes.

Kelly---

As the army is now, it is very playable and historically debatable. But I
believe that the numbers still don't really jive in relation to other lists for
the troop type and it's availability. Additionally, what in the world has
happened to the bow in the Takabara troop type! This is distressing to me as I
own 96 of these little beasties.

kw






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[Craig Scott]

We know Iphicrates was there and we know that some Persian Takabara
after the King's peace had 12 ft. spears, we know he was training
troops in Persian service. The question is; Do you
want to give them 2 ranks fighting ability? They should in either
case waver as most loose troops waver now when charged by mounted in
the open. Unlike the elite Iphicratids, of course we will never fully
know. The doubt factor should be treated with circumspect and
prudence... Bill and Kelly both make very good arguments. You know
where I stand.
More critical and clearer documentation for other Achaemenid items
will come after the convention (o: Be well and looking forward to
seeing all you smart guys!! Oh now I can say I-fic-cratees (o:

Warmest regards,

Craig Scott


--- In WarriorRules@yahoogroups.com, kelly wilkinson
<jwilkinson62@y...> wrote:
> Hi Bill, My comments will be written after each of your points
below.
>
> tabletop06897 <lowclan@m...> wrote:
> 1. Given the few hard facts left to us from the wreck of the
> Classical world, it is often necessary to rely on inference,
analogy
> and probability in order to derive a coherent narrative of military
> events or developments. In assessing alternative interpretations,
> it is often tempting to engage in "wargamer logic" … reasoning
that
> is more result-oriented advocacy than balanced and well-considered
> reconstruction … but always a mistake. The best remedy for
this
> mistaken approach is to get as close to the sources as we can, and
> maintain awareness of what's original and what's just inference.
>
> Kelly--
>
> My question for this is how one comes up with the random number of
8 elements for Iphicratean Hoplites as allowed by the Later
Acheamenid List in CW. Further, how does one speculate that the Saite
Egyptians, who were a Persian satrapy in rebellion, can have 24
elements of the afforementioned troops? If these troops are available
throught the periods of instability for the rebels, then why aren't
they available in the same numbers for the Loyalists/Persians?
>
> 2. The original post in this thread cites the account set
forth
> in Nick Sekunda's Osprey booklet on the Achaemenid Persian army as
> if it were a clear and undisputed primary source. It is neither;
it
> is, rather, a clever and imaginative reconstruction of a few bits
> and pieces known about the development of the Iphicratean reforms
> and the later career of that general, filling in the gaps with
> inference and supposition.
>
> Kelly--
>
> Go back and read the post again. Osprey is quoted and nowhere is
there any statement that this is an original source. But Osprey does
site at least several historical references which I doubt are
supposition. As far as inferncial data, this is what get from being
dabblers in history.
>
> 3. Sekunda says as much (speaking generally about the poor
> state of sources on Persian military history generally, but equally
> applicable here) in his introduction on page 3 of the Osprey
> booklet: "… what follows must be regarded as a personal, and
> provisional, interpretation of the evidence."
>
> Kelly--
>
> You are correct, but Iphicrates and his deeds are recorded
by "Greek" sources rather than that of Persian sources which are the
subject of Sekunda's comments. Further read the section again and it
is Greek sources that are noted. Diodorus specifically in the
section.
>
> 4. The reality is that no one really knows when the reforms
> were instituted, exactly why and under what circumstances, or even
> that the attribution to Iphicrates is entirely correct. It is
> perhaps more likely that the process was a gradual one, with
> elements falling into place at different times and places.
>
> Kelly--
>
> Perhaps this is so, but it seems that it is a given that it did
occur and this reform allowed to more than one army in CW.
Additionally as Craig Scott has already stated, reforms in Greek
Warfare always infected the Persian military considering their
widespread use of "Greek troops."
>
>
>
> 5. There is no reasonably contemporary account of the reforms,
> the only direct sources being the much later Diodorus Siculus and,
> of lesser interest, Cornelius Nepos, neither of which provides much
> detail.
>
> Kelly--
>
> Nonetheless FHE must feel that the evidence is sufficient
otherwise, it would not have been included in CW.
>
>
>
> 6. H.W. Parke, in his Greek Mercenary Soldiers from the
> Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus, pp. 77-81, sets out a more
> nuanced (and almost certainly more accurate) statement of the
case.
> He notes that the translation of the pertinent passage suggests
that
> Diodorus at least believed that Iphicrates instituted the reforms
> after the Egyptian campaign by drawing on the lessons learned in
> that experience. ("He [Iphicrates] having acquired additional and
> lengthy experience of all military matters in the Persian war made
> many inventions, which were of military value, and was particularly
> renowned for those to do with equipment.")
>
> Kelly--
>
> Would this be the same book that Mr. Parke authored in 1933? I read
that one during my Officer Basic course at Fort Sill. But that is
only Parke's opinion which makes this a Parke verses Sekunda opinion
and not more accurate.
>
> 7. G.K. Anderson, Military Theory and Practice in the Age of
> Xenophon, p. 129 (but cf. p. 130), appears for the most part to
> agree with Parke, while wargamer Luke Ueda-Sarson, in two articles
> on The Evolution of Hellenistic Infantry, published in Slingshot
222
> (May 2002), pp.30-36, and 223 (July 2002), pages 23-28, actually
> argues that the ideas came to Iphicrates as a result of his facing
> similarly-armed Egyptian marines and were first tested on Greek
> epibatai … hoplites serving as marines … specifically for
naval
> warfare.
>
> 8. Actually, the Iphicratean "reforms" involved significant
> improvements in morale, discipline and esprit de corps, as well as
> improved equipment, and these "reforms" were already well-advanced
> long before Pharnabazus' campaign against Egypt in 374 BC.
> Iphicrates had reformed his mercenary peltasts in this sense,
though
> still armed in traditional style, as early as the Corinthian War,
> when they destroyed a Spartan mora at Lechaion in 390 BC.
>
>
>
> 9. More telling perhaps is the account of the behavior of the
> peltasts of Chabrias (a rival Athenian mercenary commander and
> condottiere in the period), in one instance facing down the Spartan
> king Agesilaos. Chabrias' peltasts appear to have been drawn up in
> good order on higher ground, and on his command dropped to one
knee,
> propping their shields against the other knee and grounding their
> spears to receive the enemy's charge. Agesilaos, surprised and
> disheartened by their discipline and good order, withdrew his
> hoplite force without attacking. This account is perfectly
> consistent with well-trained and motivated mercenaries armed in
> the "new" manner, and utterly incomprehensible if applied to
> traditional light-armed peltasts. However, this incident occurred
> in 378 BC, four years before the Egyptian campaign.
>
> Kelly---
>
> Cool. 8 and 9 disagree with 6 and 7. It's good to see that your
unbiased as usual.
>
> 10. In short, on the historical record, it is perfectly
possible
> that Iphicrates did invent or adapt the new equipment based on his
> experiences in Persian service, and that he instituted his reforms
> at the time of or shortly after the Egyptian campaign. However, it
> is by no means certain that he did so and some of the best sources
> we have suggest that he did not. It cannot in any event be said
> that they were "originated" by the Persians or that they had any
> special connection to the Persian military.
>
> Kelly---
>
> Actually we are back to the opinion game of various Authors and
what they interpret to be Cornelius Nepos and Diodorus Siculus were
thinking. But more importantly to this game is that FHE believes that
these reforms are Iphicratean as this is what this troop type is
called in CW. I suppose that When he(Iphicrates) instituted his
changes is of lesser importance. But it is historical record that he
did train and lead such troops for Persia which,if I'm not mistaken,
Craig Scott believes becomes the blueprint for the later Takabara and
is another conversation altogether.
>
>
> 11. (If there is a foreign connection, it is more likely to be
> with Thrace; Iphicrates was a son-in-law of Cotys, king of the
> Odrysian Thracians, and fought a number of campaigns in that
> region. Thracian peltasts were capable of fighting in loose order
> with long spears as well as javelins.)
>
> 12. What then does all this have to do with the argument in
the
> original post? First, it cannot be maintained with the original
> post that "the Iphicratean hoplite was originated and first used by
> the Persians" (or in the follow-up post that the Persians were
> the "originators" of the troop type). The training, tactics and
> motivation of a Greek condottiere cannot be attributed so loosely
> to "the Persians," nor can one make the logical jump to some
> inferential special connection between the Persian military and the
> reformed Iphicrateans.
>
> Kelly---
>
> I can agree with this. But then again, contemporary historians seem
to disagree when this reform actually took place.
>
> 13. Second, there is no sufficient basis to assume that
> Iphricrates reformed all or any particular portion of the non-
> hoplite Greek mercenaries available to Pharnabazos for the Egyptian
> campaign, and thus no good basis for the argument comparing the
> number of elements allowed by the Later Achaemenid list to a number
> of Iphicrateans presumed to be engaged in the campaign.
>
> Kelly---
>
> Okay Bill, help me understand how you came up with the figure of 8
elements being available for the Persian Empire verses that of 24 for
their Rebellious Satrapy? One thought that comes to mind is that the
Egyptians aquired many of theirs from the 12,000 man force that
disentigrated upon Iphicrate's departure. That is just my suppostion.
What is your thinking on this?
>
> 14. (The original post compounds that error by misrepresenting
> the number of elements allowed in CW #6, Early Thracian, to
> represent the Ten Thousand, asserting that 24 elements are there
> allowed to represent 10,000 men. This is incorrect. Only 12
> elements of the total 24 elements of Greek Hoplites may be upgraded
> to Reg B to represent the ex-Cyreans.)
>
> Kelly---
>
> Great, then taking the fact that the force that Iphicrates trained
and led into Pharabazzus' campaign was 12,000, one could extrapolate
14 or 16 elements?
>
> 15. The follow-up post criticizes the "paltry" number of
> Iphicratean Hoplites available in the Later Achaemenid list and
> makes the argument more explicitly that Greek mercenaries should be
> numerous enough to make up the bulk (and at least half) of a Later
> Achaemenid infantry force. In fact, they are. The Later
Achaemenid
> list allows 24 elements of Greek Mercenary Hoplites, plus a further
> 36 elements of Ionian Greeks (if that is how you want to bring
them,
> as opposed to Egyptians or native Kardaka), on top of the
> Iphicratean Hoplites (and in addition to the 24 elements of
> Takabara), for a remarkable 68 elements or 272 Greek mercenary
> hoplites (traditional and reformed) in Persian service … far
more,
> if you took them all, than you could ever afford at the usual point
> cost and certainly all the infantry you would need for a standard
> sized army.
>
> Kelly---
>
> This is certainly true. But one could simply not add to the total
numbers and merely make it an *option* to make a portion of the total
Merc force as Iphicritid hoplites.
>
> 16. One could go further, and question whether all of the
newly-
> equipped former peltasts available for Pharnabazos' Egyptian
> campaign were sufficiently confident and well-trained to take
> advantage of their greater mobility, rather than behaving more like
> traditionally-armed hoplites.
>
> Kelly---
>
> You could argue that, but considering that they were trained and
led by the "master" Iphicrates and successfully employed, this would
most likely be incorrect. But hey, anything can be argued in history
as everybody has their own opinion. But consider this, does it really
matter if Iphicrates lead this style of hoplite? If they were readily
available for the Egyptians, it would seem that the even deeper
pockets of the Persian empire could afford the same numbers and why
not? Just looking at the numbers of available hoplites seems to agree.
>
> 17. But at a certain point you have to call a halt to the
> speculation. The questions are endless, and many answerless.
> Demanding that level of detail is to press the sources too far, and
> really to miss the point. As has been pointed out on the Group
> already, the number of elements in a list is generally not based on
> any particular number of troops at any particular time or place,
but
> rather on the basis of overall proportions of the whole and a sense
> of what the army should look like during the period covered by the
> list.
>
> Kelly---
>
> See my point above.
>
> 18. Overall, the number and types of Greek mercenaries allowed
> in the Later Achaemenid list appears to be reasonable and correct
> for our purposes.
>
> Kelly---
>
> As the army is now, it is very playable and historically debatable.
But I believe that the numbers still don't really jive in relation to
other lists for the troop type and it's availability. Additionally,
what in the world has happened to the bow in the Takabara troop type!
This is distressing to me as I own 96 of these little beasties.
>
> kw
>
>
>
>
>
>
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[Bill Low]

At the risk of all those on the Group not interested in the subject
zoning out altogether, here are a few thoughts on the recent posts
on Iphicratean Hoplites and Takabara in the Later Achaemenid List.

1. In general, we answer "why" questions to explain our
reasoning, not to get into arguments. This is because an advocate
can always find something to say in pushing an agenda, and it all
gets a little pointless after a while.

2. The one thing that really catches our collective eye on list
matters is citation to a good original source or a persuasive modern
argument. So far, we don't think we have seen either on this
subject.

3. Sorting through the recent posts, it seems to us that there
are really only two arguments being made about the Later Achaemenid
Persian list: first, there are too few Greek mercenary Iphricratean
Hoplites, and second, non-Greek native Takabara should get the
benefit of Greek Infantry Hoplite Rule #1. Success on either point
would give the proponents more list-rule-advantaged LMI LTS, Sh,
which appears to be the objective. To date, no persuasive authority
has been cited for either proposition.

4. The first argument was addressed by my last post, which
still stands. In so far as the specifics of the reply to that post
are concerned, (a) the number of Iphicratean Hoplites is greater in
the Saitic Egyptian list b/c we think that they were relatively more
important in an Egyptian army of that period than in a Later
Achaemenid army, (b) there is no indication that Sekunda is relying
on anything other than Diodorus (and not some undisclosed Persian
source), and (c) while the Persians did react to Greek military
developments, there is no consensus that Persians imitating Greek
troop types performed as well. Aside from these specifics, we
disagree strongly with the idea that it is all a matter
of "opinion," as if all opinions were entitled to the same weight.
They are not. It is a matter of authority and persuasive argument,
not personal preference or desire. (And no, there is no "conflict"
between points 8/9 and 6/7.)

5. A further indication of the speculative and personal
character of Sekunda's reconstruction of events … if one were
needed, given his explicit statement on this account … is to be seen
in the final remark in the Osprey passage, on p. 27, asserting: "…
Philip of Macedon used the concept to reform the Macedonian army in
359 BC. The Macedonian word used for the 12-foot `Iphicratean' pike
was sarissa." Whoa. Now there's a controversial remark, presented
flatly (at this point) as historical fact. It isn't. I am not
aware of any ancient author who makes this claim, and in particular
(while there is disagreement on the specifics) the early Macedonian
sarissa is thought to have been longer than 12 feet. While the
theory is intriguing and even inherently likely, to some extent, it
is not "historical fact." (The idea is not new, and has been
broached before in wargaming circles, but that doesn't make it
correct. For a fuller discussion of the subject, see the article by
Richard Nelson in Slingshot, 49/30-33.)

6. The second argument is an alternate route to get to the same
place. In order to justify a list rule advantage for non-Greek
Takabara, the proponent seems to be suggesting that they were
similar if not the same as Iphicratean Hoplites, arguing that (a)
Iphicrates was instructed by Persian officers in instituting the
reforms, (b) Iphicrates himself was as much Persian as Greek, and
(c) Iphicrates was a close personal friend of Pharnabazos,
concluding that since Iphicrates was training Greek mercs in the new
techniques while in Persian service, and since Persians subsequently
show up with similar armament, it follows that Iphicrates trained
them as well as the Greeks and therefore they should have the same
capability. This is a novel and imaginative theory, but it has
virtually no foundation in the historical record and is inherently
rather unlikely.

7. In the first place, our sources such as they are attribute
the reforms to Iphicrates, personally, as evidence of his personal
creativity and contributions. Nothing suggests that he acted at
Persian prompting. (And of course parallel developments on the
Greek mainland noted previously make it even less likely.)

8. Secondly, there is no reason to think that Iphicrates was
unusually subject to Persian influence. He may have served at
Cnidos, but then perhaps half the fleet was Greek and so this was
nothing unusual. By the time he was twenty, he was leading peltasts
for Athens in the Corinthian War. He worked for a few years toward
the end of his career as a condottiere for Persia. But the
overwhelming majority of Iphicrates' active military career was in
Athenian service or on his own hook in the Thrace-ward regions.
Again, if he had a foreign connection, it was with Thrace, as
attested by the anecdote attributed to his son by a Thracian
princess, Menestheus, who claimed that his father tried to make him
as Thracian as he could.

9. By contrast, it would be highly unusual for a high-born
Persian grandee like Pharnabazos (who was a descendent of Otanes,
one of the seven nobles who assisted Darius in the murder of the
pseudo-Smerdis, and thus of the very highest tier of the Persian
nobility) to take any notice of the 18-year old son of an Athenian
cobbler, esp. since Conon, the Athenian commander of the fleet, is
said by Cornelius Nepos to have previously acquired a high degree of
personal influence over Pharnabazos.

10. The relationship of the Greek condottiere to the Persian
Empire is perhaps best illustrated by the example of the Athenian
Chabrias. When Pharnabazos wished to remove him from the command of
the Egyptian fleet, he did not simply order him to resign, which he
presumably could have done if he were a Persian officer or subject;
rather, he threatened the Athenians with the Great King's
displeasure, and Athens then recalled him. The condottiere remained
first and foremost a citizen of a Greek polis, and whatever loyalty
he felt toward a barbarian employer would have been very much a
secondary consideration.

11. More perhaps to the point, I am not aware of any authority
who claims that Iphicrates trained non-Greek Takabara. It is not
enough to say that he was in the same place at the same time, and
therefore that he "must" have trained them. Such an unusual event
would require more than mere supposition.

12. One could note in passing, with respect to the lesser points
in the recent posts, that while the Persians occupied parts of
Thrace for a time, the last garrison had been driven out of those
regions over 100 years before the period under discussion, and it is
in any case doubtful whether they had any material impact while they
were there. Moreover, there is a significant difference between
instances in which a Babylonian or a member of any of the other
subject peoples of the Persian Empire might have risen to high
command, and paid professional service by a free man of a free
republic. In any case, it will have been exceedingly rare for a non-
Persian (or perhaps a Mede) ever to have had command over a
significant body of Persian national troops, with the exception of
naval commands in which the Persians seem to have recognized their
limitations. (Off hand I can think of only one exception, Datames,
who is said to have been of Carian descent.)

13. We are not shy about making a list change where we think the
evidence warrants it. Check out the existing volume of errata.
However, we are reluctant to make changes based on what seems to be
result-oriented inferential reasoning that requires an overbroad
leap of faith. Such appears to us to be the case here.

[Craig Scott]

Here we go again; first Athens was a puppet of Persia and acting in
their behest. Athens is operating under the King's peace during the
various Peloponnesian wars. Sekunda ain't my only source, you ignored
Burns and I have others, more on this later. I will also to contact
Dr. Nick Sekunda for more clarifications.
Yes Iphricates was throwing pebbles on the beaches of Asia Minor
preparing his heterogeneous myriads for the re-invasion of Egypt for
years. Sure, right.
The whole issue could have been avoided by not having the LTS for
these troops in the first place, as stated earlier. What sources do
you use for the sub-units for the Takabara? A lot more on this after
H-con, be well all.

Sincerely,
Craig



This whole issue could have

--- In WarriorRules@yahoogroups.com, "tabletop06897" <lowclan@m...>
wrote:
> At the risk of all those on the Group not interested in the subject
> zoning out altogether, here are a few thoughts on the recent posts
> on Iphicratean Hoplites and Takabara in the Later Achaemenid List.
>
> 1. In general, we answer "why" questions to explain our
> reasoning, not to get into arguments. This is because an advocate
> can always find something to say in pushing an agenda, and it all
> gets a little pointless after a while.
>
> 2. The one thing that really catches our collective eye on list
> matters is citation to a good original source or a persuasive
modern
> argument. So far, we don't think we have seen either on this
> subject.
>
> 3. Sorting through the recent posts, it seems to us that there
> are really only two arguments being made about the Later Achaemenid
> Persian list: first, there are too few Greek mercenary
Iphricratean
> Hoplites, and second, non-Greek native Takabara should get the
> benefit of Greek Infantry Hoplite Rule #1. Success on either point
> would give the proponents more list-rule-advantaged LMI LTS, Sh,
> which appears to be the objective. To date, no persuasive
authority
> has been cited for either proposition.
>
> 4. The first argument was addressed by my last post, which
> still stands. In so far as the specifics of the reply to that post
> are concerned, (a) the number of Iphicratean Hoplites is greater in
> the Saitic Egyptian list b/c we think that they were relatively
more
> important in an Egyptian army of that period than in a Later
> Achaemenid army, (b) there is no indication that Sekunda is relying
> on anything other than Diodorus (and not some undisclosed Persian
> source), and (c) while the Persians did react to Greek military
> developments, there is no consensus that Persians imitating Greek
> troop types performed as well. Aside from these specifics, we
> disagree strongly with the idea that it is all a matter
> of "opinion," as if all opinions were entitled to the same weight.
> They are not. It is a matter of authority and persuasive argument,
> not personal preference or desire. (And no, there is no "conflict"
> between points 8/9 and 6/7.)
>
> 5. A further indication of the speculative and personal
> character of Sekunda's reconstruction of events … if one were
> needed, given his explicit statement on this account … is to be
seen
> in the final remark in the Osprey passage, on p. 27, asserting:
"…
> Philip of Macedon used the concept to reform the Macedonian army in
> 359 BC. The Macedonian word used for the 12-foot `Iphicratean'
pike
> was sarissa." Whoa. Now there's a controversial remark, presented
> flatly (at this point) as historical fact. It isn't. I am not
> aware of any ancient author who makes this claim, and in particular
> (while there is disagreement on the specifics) the early Macedonian
> sarissa is thought to have been longer than 12 feet. While the
> theory is intriguing and even inherently likely, to some extent, it
> is not "historical fact." (The idea is not new, and has been
> broached before in wargaming circles, but that doesn't make it
> correct. For a fuller discussion of the subject, see the article
by
> Richard Nelson in Slingshot, 49/30-33.)
>
> 6. The second argument is an alternate route to get to the same
> place. In order to justify a list rule advantage for non-Greek
> Takabara, the proponent seems to be suggesting that they were
> similar if not the same as Iphicratean Hoplites, arguing that (a)
> Iphicrates was instructed by Persian officers in instituting the
> reforms, (b) Iphicrates himself was as much Persian as Greek, and
> (c) Iphicrates was a close personal friend of Pharnabazos,
> concluding that since Iphicrates was training Greek mercs in the
new
> techniques while in Persian service, and since Persians
subsequently
> show up with similar armament, it follows that Iphicrates trained
> them as well as the Greeks and therefore they should have the same
> capability. This is a novel and imaginative theory, but it has
> virtually no foundation in the historical record and is inherently
> rather unlikely.
>
> 7. In the first place, our sources such as they are attribute
> the reforms to Iphicrates, personally, as evidence of his personal
> creativity and contributions. Nothing suggests that he acted at
> Persian prompting. (And of course parallel developments on the
> Greek mainland noted previously make it even less likely.)
>
> 8. Secondly, there is no reason to think that Iphicrates was
> unusually subject to Persian influence. He may have served at
> Cnidos, but then perhaps half the fleet was Greek and so this was
> nothing unusual. By the time he was twenty, he was leading
peltasts
> for Athens in the Corinthian War. He worked for a few years toward
> the end of his career as a condottiere for Persia. But the
> overwhelming majority of Iphicrates' active military career was in
> Athenian service or on his own hook in the Thrace-ward regions.
> Again, if he had a foreign connection, it was with Thrace, as
> attested by the anecdote attributed to his son by a Thracian
> princess, Menestheus, who claimed that his father tried to make him
> as Thracian as he could.
>
> 9. By contrast, it would be highly unusual for a high-born
> Persian grandee like Pharnabazos (who was a descendent of Otanes,
> one of the seven nobles who assisted Darius in the murder of the
> pseudo-Smerdis, and thus of the very highest tier of the Persian
> nobility) to take any notice of the 18-year old son of an Athenian
> cobbler, esp. since Conon, the Athenian commander of the fleet, is
> said by Cornelius Nepos to have previously acquired a high degree
of
> personal influence over Pharnabazos.
>
> 10. The relationship of the Greek condottiere to the Persian
> Empire is perhaps best illustrated by the example of the Athenian
> Chabrias. When Pharnabazos wished to remove him from the command
of
> the Egyptian fleet, he did not simply order him to resign, which he
> presumably could have done if he were a Persian officer or subject;
> rather, he threatened the Athenians with the Great King's
> displeasure, and Athens then recalled him. The condottiere
remained
> first and foremost a citizen of a Greek polis, and whatever loyalty
> he felt toward a barbarian employer would have been very much a
> secondary consideration.
>
> 11. More perhaps to the point, I am not aware of any authority
> who claims that Iphicrates trained non-Greek Takabara. It is not
> enough to say that he was in the same place at the same time, and
> therefore that he "must" have trained them. Such an unusual event
> would require more than mere supposition.
>
> 12. One could note in passing, with respect to the lesser points
> in the recent posts, that while the Persians occupied parts of
> Thrace for a time, the last garrison had been driven out of those
> regions over 100 years before the period under discussion, and it
is
> in any case doubtful whether they had any material impact while
they
> were there. Moreover, there is a significant difference between
> instances in which a Babylonian or a member of any of the other
> subject peoples of the Persian Empire might have risen to high
> command, and paid professional service by a free man of a free
> republic. In any case, it will have been exceedingly rare for a
non-
> Persian (or perhaps a Mede) ever to have had command over a
> significant body of Persian national troops, with the exception of
> naval commands in which the Persians seem to have recognized their
> limitations. (Off hand I can think of only one exception, Datames,
> who is said to have been of Carian descent.)
>
> 13. We are not shy about making a list change where we think the
> evidence warrants it. Check out the existing volume of errata.
> However, we are reluctant to make changes based on what seems to be
> result-oriented inferential reasoning that requires an overbroad
> leap of faith. Such appears to us to be the case here.

[Craig Scott]

The Greek Polis was controlled by the Artaxerxes II at this time.

Their were more Persian subjects of "Greek heritage" than of "Persian
heritage" in the Achaemenid empire. Do we say the Japanese; Nisei
battalions of WWII are Japanese or are they Americans of Japanese
decent? The Persians were great horsemen of the Iranian plateau and
took advantage astonishingly, immediately of the seafaring peoples of
the eastern Mediterranean and Indian Ocean.

Please think not as a late 19th or early 20th British historian,
Charles Omstead started breaking that mold about 75 years ago. This
Persia empire is cosmopolitan, not through Helophile lens. Thank you.

Craig
--- In WarriorRules@yahoogroups.com, "tabletop06897" <lowclan@m...>
wrote:
> At the risk of all those on the Group not interested in the subject
> zoning out altogether, here are a few thoughts on the recent posts
> on Iphicratean Hoplites and Takabara in the Later Achaemenid List.
>
> 1. In general, we answer "why" questions to explain our
> reasoning, not to get into arguments. This is because an advocate
> can always find something to say in pushing an agenda, and it all
> gets a little pointless after a while.
>
> 2. The one thing that really catches our collective eye on list
> matters is citation to a good original source or a persuasive
modern
> argument. So far, we don't think we have seen either on this
> subject.
>
> 3. Sorting through the recent posts, it seems to us that there
> are really only two arguments being made about the Later Achaemenid
> Persian list: first, there are too few Greek mercenary
Iphricratean
> Hoplites, and second, non-Greek native Takabara should get the
> benefit of Greek Infantry Hoplite Rule #1. Success on either point
> would give the proponents more list-rule-advantaged LMI LTS, Sh,
> which appears to be the objective. To date, no persuasive
authority
> has been cited for either proposition.
>
> 4. The first argument was addressed by my last post, which
> still stands. In so far as the specifics of the reply to that post
> are concerned, (a) the number of Iphicratean Hoplites is greater in
> the Saitic Egyptian list b/c we think that they were relatively
more
> important in an Egyptian army of that period than in a Later
> Achaemenid army, (b) there is no indication that Sekunda is relying
> on anything other than Diodorus (and not some undisclosed Persian
> source), and (c) while the Persians did react to Greek military
> developments, there is no consensus that Persians imitating Greek
> troop types performed as well. Aside from these specifics, we
> disagree strongly with the idea that it is all a matter
> of "opinion," as if all opinions were entitled to the same weight.
> They are not. It is a matter of authority and persuasive argument,
> not personal preference or desire. (And no, there is no "conflict"
> between points 8/9 and 6/7.)
>
> 5. A further indication of the speculative and personal
> character of Sekunda's reconstruction of events … if one were
> needed, given his explicit statement on this account … is to be
seen
> in the final remark in the Osprey passage, on p. 27, asserting:
"…
> Philip of Macedon used the concept to reform the Macedonian army in
> 359 BC. The Macedonian word used for the 12-foot `Iphicratean'
pike
> was sarissa." Whoa. Now there's a controversial remark, presented
> flatly (at this point) as historical fact. It isn't. I am not
> aware of any ancient author who makes this claim, and in particular
> (while there is disagreement on the specifics) the early Macedonian
> sarissa is thought to have been longer than 12 feet. While the
> theory is intriguing and even inherently likely, to some extent, it
> is not "historical fact." (The idea is not new, and has been
> broached before in wargaming circles, but that doesn't make it
> correct. For a fuller discussion of the subject, see the article
by
> Richard Nelson in Slingshot, 49/30-33.)
>
> 6. The second argument is an alternate route to get to the same
> place. In order to justify a list rule advantage for non-Greek
> Takabara, the proponent seems to be suggesting that they were
> similar if not the same as Iphicratean Hoplites, arguing that (a)
> Iphicrates was instructed by Persian officers in instituting the
> reforms, (b) Iphicrates himself was as much Persian as Greek, and
> (c) Iphicrates was a close personal friend of Pharnabazos,
> concluding that since Iphicrates was training Greek mercs in the
new
> techniques while in Persian service, and since Persians
subsequently
> show up with similar armament, it follows that Iphicrates trained
> them as well as the Greeks and therefore they should have the same
> capability. This is a novel and imaginative theory, but it has
> virtually no foundation in the historical record and is inherently
> rather unlikely.
>
> 7. In the first place, our sources such as they are attribute
> the reforms to Iphicrates, personally, as evidence of his personal
> creativity and contributions. Nothing suggests that he acted at
> Persian prompting. (And of course parallel developments on the
> Greek mainland noted previously make it even less likely.)
>
> 8. Secondly, there is no reason to think that Iphicrates was
> unusually subject to Persian influence. He may have served at
> Cnidos, but then perhaps half the fleet was Greek and so this was
> nothing unusual. By the time he was twenty, he was leading
peltasts
> for Athens in the Corinthian War. He worked for a few years toward
> the end of his career as a condottiere for Persia. But the
> overwhelming majority of Iphicrates' active military career was in
> Athenian service or on his own hook in the Thrace-ward regions.
> Again, if he had a foreign connection, it was with Thrace, as
> attested by the anecdote attributed to his son by a Thracian
> princess, Menestheus, who claimed that his father tried to make him
> as Thracian as he could.
>
> 9. By contrast, it would be highly unusual for a high-born
> Persian grandee like Pharnabazos (who was a descendent of Otanes,
> one of the seven nobles who assisted Darius in the murder of the
> pseudo-Smerdis, and thus of the very highest tier of the Persian
> nobility) to take any notice of the 18-year old son of an Athenian
> cobbler, esp. since Conon, the Athenian commander of the fleet, is
> said by Cornelius Nepos to have previously acquired a high degree
of
> personal influence over Pharnabazos.
>
> 10. The relationship of the Greek condottiere to the Persian
> Empire is perhaps best illustrated by the example of the Athenian
> Chabrias. When Pharnabazos wished to remove him from the command
of
> the Egyptian fleet, he did not simply order him to resign, which he
> presumably could have done if he were a Persian officer or subject;
> rather, he threatened the Athenians with the Great King's
> displeasure, and Athens then recalled him. The condottiere
remained
> first and foremost a citizen of a Greek polis, and whatever loyalty
> he felt toward a barbarian employer would have been very much a
> secondary consideration.
>
> 11. More perhaps to the point, I am not aware of any authority
> who claims that Iphicrates trained non-Greek Takabara. It is not
> enough to say that he was in the same place at the same time, and
> therefore that he "must" have trained them. Such an unusual event
> would require more than mere supposition.
>
> 12. One could note in passing, with respect to the lesser points
> in the recent posts, that while the Persians occupied parts of
> Thrace for a time, the last garrison had been driven out of those
> regions over 100 years before the period under discussion, and it
is
> in any case doubtful whether they had any material impact while
they
> were there. Moreover, there is a significant difference between
> instances in which a Babylonian or a member of any of the other
> subject peoples of the Persian Empire might have risen to high
> command, and paid professional service by a free man of a free
> republic. In any case, it will have been exceedingly rare for a
non-
> Persian (or perhaps a Mede) ever to have had command over a
> significant body of Persian national troops, with the exception of
> naval commands in which the Persians seem to have recognized their
> limitations. (Off hand I can think of only one exception, Datames,
> who is said to have been of Carian descent.)
>
> 13. We are not shy about making a list change where we think the
> evidence warrants it. Check out the existing volume of errata.
> However, we are reluctant to make changes based on what seems to be
> result-oriented inferential reasoning that requires an overbroad
> leap of faith. Such appears to us to be the case here.

[Bill Chriss]

> At the risk of all those on the Group not interested in the subject
> zoning out altogether, here are a few thoughts on the recent posts
> on Iphicratean Hoplites and Takabara in the Later Achaemenid List.
>


Oh no. I, for one, am into historical miniatures largely to engage in such
discussions. And, again, I find your arguments well-stated, logical, and
convincing. I hope to meet you at Hcon, Bill.


-Greek

[Craig Scott]

Oops "A.T." Olmstead, that is what I get for goofing out work (;

--- In WarriorRules@yahoogroups.com, "craigshar2" <craigshar@c...>
wrote:
> The Greek Polis was controlled by the Artaxerxes II at this time.
>
> Their were more Persian subjects of "Greek heritage" than
of "Persian
> heritage" in the Achaemenid empire. Do we say the Japanese; Nisei
> battalions of WWII are Japanese or are they Americans of Japanese
> decent? The Persians were great horsemen of the Iranian plateau and
> took advantage astonishingly, immediately of the seafaring peoples
of
> the eastern Mediterranean and Indian Ocean.
>
> Please think not as a late 19th or early 20th British historian,
> Charles Omstead started breaking that mold about 75 years ago. This
> Persia empire is cosmopolitan, not through Helophile lens. Thank
you.
>
> Craig
> --- In WarriorRules@yahoogroups.com, "tabletop06897" <lowclan@m...>
> wrote:
> > At the risk of all those on the Group not interested in the
subject
> > zoning out altogether, here are a few thoughts on the recent
posts
> > on Iphicratean Hoplites and Takabara in the Later Achaemenid List.
> >
> > 1. In general, we answer "why" questions to explain our
> > reasoning, not to get into arguments. This is because an
advocate
> > can always find something to say in pushing an agenda, and it all
> > gets a little pointless after a while.
> >
> > 2. The one thing that really catches our collective eye on list
> > matters is citation to a good original source or a persuasive
> modern
> > argument. So far, we don't think we have seen either on this
> > subject.
> >
> > 3. Sorting through the recent posts, it seems to us that there
> > are really only two arguments being made about the Later
Achaemenid
> > Persian list: first, there are too few Greek mercenary
> Iphricratean
> > Hoplites, and second, non-Greek native Takabara should get the
> > benefit of Greek Infantry Hoplite Rule #1. Success on either
point
> > would give the proponents more list-rule-advantaged LMI LTS, Sh,
> > which appears to be the objective. To date, no persuasive
> authority
> > has been cited for either proposition.
> >
> > 4. The first argument was addressed by my last post, which
> > still stands. In so far as the specifics of the reply to that
post
> > are concerned, (a) the number of Iphicratean Hoplites is greater
in
> > the Saitic Egyptian list b/c we think that they were relatively
> more
> > important in an Egyptian army of that period than in a Later
> > Achaemenid army, (b) there is no indication that Sekunda is
relying
> > on anything other than Diodorus (and not some undisclosed Persian
> > source), and (c) while the Persians did react to Greek military
> > developments, there is no consensus that Persians imitating Greek
> > troop types performed as well. Aside from these specifics, we
> > disagree strongly with the idea that it is all a matter
> > of "opinion," as if all opinions were entitled to the same
weight.
> > They are not. It is a matter of authority and persuasive
argument,
> > not personal preference or desire. (And no, there is
no "conflict"
> > between points 8/9 and 6/7.)
> >
> > 5. A further indication of the speculative and personal
> > character of Sekunda's reconstruction of events … if one were
> > needed, given his explicit statement on this account … is to
be
> seen
> > in the final remark in the Osprey passage, on p. 27, asserting:
> "…
> > Philip of Macedon used the concept to reform the Macedonian army
in
> > 359 BC. The Macedonian word used for the 12-foot `Iphicratean'
> pike
> > was sarissa." Whoa. Now there's a controversial remark,
presented
> > flatly (at this point) as historical fact. It isn't. I am not
> > aware of any ancient author who makes this claim, and in
particular
> > (while there is disagreement on the specifics) the early
Macedonian
> > sarissa is thought to have been longer than 12 feet. While the
> > theory is intriguing and even inherently likely, to some extent,
it
> > is not "historical fact." (The idea is not new, and has been
> > broached before in wargaming circles, but that doesn't make it
> > correct. For a fuller discussion of the subject, see the article
> by
> > Richard Nelson in Slingshot, 49/30-33.)
> >
> > 6. The second argument is an alternate route to get to the same
> > place. In order to justify a list rule advantage for non-Greek
> > Takabara, the proponent seems to be suggesting that they were
> > similar if not the same as Iphicratean Hoplites, arguing that (a)
> > Iphicrates was instructed by Persian officers in instituting the
> > reforms, (b) Iphicrates himself was as much Persian as Greek, and
> > (c) Iphicrates was a close personal friend of Pharnabazos,
> > concluding that since Iphicrates was training Greek mercs in the
> new
> > techniques while in Persian service, and since Persians
> subsequently
> > show up with similar armament, it follows that Iphicrates trained
> > them as well as the Greeks and therefore they should have the
same
> > capability. This is a novel and imaginative theory, but it has
> > virtually no foundation in the historical record and is
inherently
> > rather unlikely.
> >
> > 7. In the first place, our sources such as they are attribute
> > the reforms to Iphicrates, personally, as evidence of his
personal
> > creativity and contributions. Nothing suggests that he acted at
> > Persian prompting. (And of course parallel developments on the
> > Greek mainland noted previously make it even less likely.)
> >
> > 8. Secondly, there is no reason to think that Iphicrates was
> > unusually subject to Persian influence. He may have served at
> > Cnidos, but then perhaps half the fleet was Greek and so this was
> > nothing unusual. By the time he was twenty, he was leading
> peltasts
> > for Athens in the Corinthian War. He worked for a few years
toward
> > the end of his career as a condottiere for Persia. But the
> > overwhelming majority of Iphicrates' active military career was
in
> > Athenian service or on his own hook in the Thrace-ward regions.
> > Again, if he had a foreign connection, it was with Thrace, as
> > attested by the anecdote attributed to his son by a Thracian
> > princess, Menestheus, who claimed that his father tried to make
him
> > as Thracian as he could.
> >
> > 9. By contrast, it would be highly unusual for a high-born
> > Persian grandee like Pharnabazos (who was a descendent of Otanes,
> > one of the seven nobles who assisted Darius in the murder of the
> > pseudo-Smerdis, and thus of the very highest tier of the Persian
> > nobility) to take any notice of the 18-year old son of an
Athenian
> > cobbler, esp. since Conon, the Athenian commander of the fleet,
is
> > said by Cornelius Nepos to have previously acquired a high degree
> of
> > personal influence over Pharnabazos.
> >
> > 10. The relationship of the Greek condottiere to the Persian
> > Empire is perhaps best illustrated by the example of the Athenian
> > Chabrias. When Pharnabazos wished to remove him from the command
> of
> > the Egyptian fleet, he did not simply order him to resign, which
he
> > presumably could have done if he were a Persian officer or
subject;
> > rather, he threatened the Athenians with the Great King's
> > displeasure, and Athens then recalled him. The condottiere
> remained
> > first and foremost a citizen of a Greek polis, and whatever
loyalty
> > he felt toward a barbarian employer would have been very much a
> > secondary consideration.
> >
> > 11. More perhaps to the point, I am not aware of any authority
> > who claims that Iphicrates trained non-Greek Takabara. It is not
> > enough to say that he was in the same place at the same time, and
> > therefore that he "must" have trained them. Such an unusual
event
> > would require more than mere supposition.
> >
> > 12. One could note in passing, with respect to the lesser points
> > in the recent posts, that while the Persians occupied parts of
> > Thrace for a time, the last garrison had been driven out of those
> > regions over 100 years before the period under discussion, and it
> is
> > in any case doubtful whether they had any material impact while
> they
> > were there. Moreover, there is a significant difference between
> > instances in which a Babylonian or a member of any of the other
> > subject peoples of the Persian Empire might have risen to high
> > command, and paid professional service by a free man of a free
> > republic. In any case, it will have been exceedingly rare for a
> non-
> > Persian (or perhaps a Mede) ever to have had command over a
> > significant body of Persian national troops, with the exception
of
> > naval commands in which the Persians seem to have recognized
their
> > limitations. (Off hand I can think of only one exception,
Datames,
> > who is said to have been of Carian descent.)
> >
> > 13. We are not shy about making a list change where we think the
> > evidence warrants it. Check out the existing volume of errata.
> > However, we are reluctant to make changes based on what seems to
be
> > result-oriented inferential reasoning that requires an overbroad
> > leap of faith. Such appears to us to be the case here.