Warrior Ancient and Medieval Rules

[Doug]

>I would argue that there are troops and troop types that excelled at single
>combat, and who followed a tactical doctrine designed to "disorder"
>both battle
>lines so that the outcome then depended on prowess at single combat. I would
>also argue that this phenomenon is an exception during the time period Warrior
covers, and thus is very difficult to capture within Warrior's rules.

What about allowing such Blades to interpenetrate the enemy 1st rank
on a sufficiently good combat result, so the Blades now fight two
full ranks; but the enemy 1st rank does not count at all any more?


FULL TEXT QUOTE:
>Part of the problem with assessing the Swiss is that we are talking about a
>troop type that comes into its own at the tail end of our period. The solution
>to the Swiss lies beyond the scope of Warrior, and involves tactics, arms, and
>armament that take us into the Rennaissance.
>
>Part of the obvious answer is gunpowder. When the accuracy, rate of fire, and
>destructiveness of gunpowder weapons evolves substantially beyond the Medieval
>handgun, then dense formations of troops not armed with a gunpowder weapon
>themselves start to lose their appeal.
>
>There probably are isolated examples like the one that Cole cites of high
>morale, highly trained, heavily armored foot standing up to and/or beating the
>Swiss outright. This interaction, however, is one that Warrior gets right.
>
>Consider a unit of Condottieri (SHK) back by seargeants (HK), dismounted.
>Assume they charge a column of Swiss who are also charging them. Assume also
>the K have had time to reorder after dismounting. Assume the Swiss are LHI in
>the front.
>
>The K are 4@4 (front rank) + 2@2 (back rank) = 16.
>The Swiss are 12@1 = 18.
>That's _easily_ within die rolls to change the outcome (remember, in any given
>combat the odds that both sides will roll even are extremely low).
>
>The other part of the answer is tactical doctrine. The Medieval
>assumption, with
>respect to hand-to-hand combat, is that basically two things matter: having
>greater density than your opponent, and having a longer pointy stick than your
>opponent. Compare, for example, the length of an 11th century Norman
>lance with
>the length of a 15th century German or Italian lance. Compare the length of a
>spear used by foot soldiers in the 3rd Crusade with the length of a
>Swiss pike.
>Density can be affected either by adding more men, adding more armor, or both.
>
>It is at the beginning of the Rennaissance that we add to this mix a counter
>troop type: the sword and buckler man.
>
>He operates in loose formations, with
>little armor, and a weapon with very little reach. How does this
>work? It works
>because once you've closed to close quarters, being a large number of men
>tightly packed can be a disadvantage, having a lot of armor that makes it
>difficult to move or maneuver can be a disadvantage, and having a 12 foot+
>weapon against an opponent who is 2 feet in front of you is a decided
>disadvantage. The trick is to get to close quarters. But that is exactly the
>tactical doctrine practiced by the sword and buclker men: how to flow, or ease
>into the enemy line without charging full tilt into their pointy sticks.
>
>I would argue that there are troops and troop types that excelled at single
>combat, and who followed a tactical doctrine designed to "disorder"
>both battle
>lines so that the outcome then depended on prowess at single combat. I would
>also argue that this phenomenon is an exception during the time period Warrior
>covers, and thus is very difficult to capture within Warrior's rules.
>
>As
>supporting evidence, I'll note that the troops who most excelled at this kind
>of disruptive single combat have proved most difficult to simulate within the
>Warrior system:
>- Vikings in general, berserks in particular (do not make the traditional
>mistake of assuming that berserker "frenzy" is without plan, intent, or
>training);
>- Varangians;
>- Almughuvars;
>- the elite among longbowmen (as they appear on either the 100 Year's War
>English list, or their continental counterpart, French Ordannance);
>- Sword and buckler men.
>
>I'll take the argument a step further and suggest that there was a cavalry
>equivalent of the sword and bucklerman, who used a short bow fired in a
>straight trajectory at point black range as effectively a hand to hand weapon,
>with the intent of disrupting cavalry lines into a similar set of single
>engagements.
>
>This is a Middle Asian style of cavalry warfare that evolves by
>the Rennaissance into the troop type we know as the Hussar, but was prominent
>in Mongol armies, and probably has its origins as far back as the Scythians.
>
>And again, I'd suggest that this kind of cavalry interaction, and the troops
>associated with it, is something Warrior has had greater than average
>difficulty in representing.
>
>Just my opinion, of course.
>
>
>-Mark Stone