Warrior Ancient and Medieval Rules

[scott holder]

In some ways, we have precious few data points to go on. Here's a very very
quick summary:

401 BC: Cyrus the Younger wins at Cunaxa. Xenophon implies that scythed
chariots were there but no account is given regarding their specific use if in
fact they were used. What sounds like *the* public relations account of
scythed chariots is from a teeny tiny tactical engagement 6 years later, a
Persian Satrap Pharnabazus used 2 scythed chariots against a 700 man hoplite
block. The chariots performed as designed, broke up the unit and the
Pharnabazus mopped it up with LI and cav. But this engagement is too small to
have any real meaning to us (or other ancient battlefield commanders) as to be
nothing more than an almost "demonstration". Nonetheless, this little
"demonstration" obviously colored the opinions of generals for the next 300
years or so.

331 BC: Darius looses the chariots on Alexander at Guagamela (Arbela). He
deploys them what we've come to expect, across the center section of his army
but we don't really have any detail if they were strewn across they way they
did with elephants or if he had three groupings of chariots, one center, one
left, and one right, and that these charged in sorta three "massive blocks".
Most (but not all) modern commentators feel the "massive block" charge is
correct and that Darius was trying to open up three "lanes" for his
cav/infantry to follow up. When Alexander shifted his army to the Macedonian
right, Darius perceived this as a move to the rough ground to Alex's right in
order to void the scythed chariot effect. He then ordered a cav charge and
then turned loose the chariots (too early). Needless to say, Alex beat them
up with LI and then the pike blocks dropped into columns after the chariots
(probably crewless by that time) were trundling merrily along so that they
passed thru harmlessly. This is an easy thing to reproduce in Warrior. I
feel that Darius' actions here are telling in our current debate about how to
treat scythed chariots. His actions strongly imply that he "knew" the
chariots weren't gonna work in the rough ground to his left so made sure they
were let go on the carefully plowed and scraped ground. This tells me that he
knew that if troops were in the rough ground, it would be pointless (at that
point) to charge the chariots, hence his precipitous action. This event
colors my judgement on allowing expendables to more or less "ignore" troops
entirely in terrain they (the expendable) can't enter.

301: Seleucus apparently had some "leftover" Persian chariots with him when
the allies ganged up and beat poor ole Antigonus One Eye at Ipsus. This is an
infuriating battle to analyze because the accounts are so sketchy. All we
know is that Antigonus' son Demetrius, leads the cav off chasing down the
enemy cav, leaving the infantry behind. Seleucus, one of the enemy, then
screened off Demetrius with 200+ elephants. Antigonus' pike formations then
stood facing Lysimachus' pike formations while Seleucus ran around the flanks
with LI and cav, effectively surrounding Antigonus. It wasn't until many of
his men surrendered and switched sides, did things fall apart and the bad guys
charged in to mop up and kill the old general. Nowhere do we see any hint of
the chariots being used. In fact, since it appears that Antigonus' infantry
position(s) were more or less pinned, it woulda been an ideal time to roll in
the chariots. But apparently that didn't happen despite the fact Seleucus had
100 of them. So, no help here. Or perhaps the terrain wasn't useful. We
simply don't know.

273 BC: The Galatians, using captured chariots, turn them loose against the
Seleucids who somehow managed to "hide" their elephants behind the infantry.
As the chariots charged in, the Seleucid infantry drop into columns (ala
Alexander's pike manaeuver at Guagamela), the elephants move forward, the
chariots slam into the elephants, the chariots rout back into the massed
Galatian foot, victory for the civilized Hellenes, a minor setback for the
fanatical Celts. We don't specifically know how the Galatians deployed the
chariots but it appeared they were either in massive blocks ala Darius or
across the army's frontage ala Charonea (see below). This battle is called
the "Elephant Victory".

190 BC: At Magnesia, the Seleucid king Antiochus lost most of his chariots to
a Roman allied force under Eumenes II of Pergamon before the battle even
started. He had deployed them on his left flank, apparently in an effort to
use them in an enveloping manuever. Eumenes never gave him a chance, instead
doing what everybody did to thwart scythed chariots back then: send up the LI
to harrass em to death. Yes the chariots did charge but again, that was done
earlier than desired and all they fought were the LI. This is another battle
that heavily colors my judgement on scythed chariots. I mean it appears that
Antiochus deployed them in such a way as to avoid rough terrain (that was on
the other flank) AND that he massed them to as to punch a big hole (or roll
up) one flank. It also infers that the general *did* have some control over
the things up until the point they charged, then all bets were off.

86 BC: The Pontic general (begins with an A) lines up his chariots in
"classic" across the front fashion. However, Roman general Sulla never gives
him a chance to even turn them loose since he comes up to the Pontic line so
fast, the chariots are only barely given the order to charge and hence, don't
get to build up a head of steam. Plutarch's description here is quite
detailed. In fact, he recounds how the Roman infantrymen, after routing some
chariots, would cat call out to the Pontics to send more of em in so they
could bash them up in turn. Now you know where the "must charge 80p in order
to get the scythe bonus" rule comes from.

There's always been a dichotomy with scythed chariots. With one exception,
scythed chariots performance in combat wasn't great. But, there is no denying
the effect their presence had on an enemy force in that said enemy force had
to plan accordingly and fight accordingly in order to negate what was
obviously perceived (rightly or wrongly) to be a very lethal theoretical
threat on the battlefield. Therein lies the apparent contradiction on scythed
chariots. Yeah, we say their performance sucked but I wonder if it didn't
have more to do with the countermeasures used against them AND the inherent
limitations (crewmen not fanatically committed to dieing so jump off) of the
platform. Undoubtedly everyone "believed" the theoretical damage these things
could cause which is why I still think an Irr A designation accurately
charactizes them. At the same time, commanders would appear to have been
somewhat aware of the grosser limitations of the platform (not going into
rough terrain for example) and the drivers were still onboard until a) killed
by some Agranian Javelinman, or b) jumped out after the charge, and as such,
had a modicum of leeway as to how they were aimed.

Yes, after they've charged, the rules are very clear and if the chariot plows
into brush, so be it. Remember, it's now an unguided ancient missile with a
limited target acquistion capability. However, prior to that, it's still
guided by orders (RUSH) but their usage at Guagamela and Magnesia at least
implies the generals knew about what the chariots *couldn't* do and there is
no indication that a chariot would have moved up to some brush with a LI unit
in it and *sat* there waiting for something else to develop.

And if someone wants to be "gamey" by putting a LI unit in some brush and
waiting for the chariot to trundle by, then pop out and potentially "freeze"
the chariot in it's tracks, great. To me, that's not "gamey", that's good
tactics by the LI player, poor tactics by the chariot player in not
potentially realizing what could go on vis a vis the terrain and planning
accordingly.

Whew! Jon will have the definitive "rules wording" on this at some point in
time. At least here you can see my historical outline which has affected my
*interpretations" on this things over the years.

Scott
List Ho

Well done Scott! Good explanation. Nice analysis, decent rules.

I knew there was a reason I didn't want to use Chariots. I think I'll
stick with my Irr A Celts.

Scott Turner

[Eric Turner]

Scott,
Excellent, the bottom line is good generalship. A tool used correctly
is effective but one who is rushed or employed it improperly (charging
elephants) will fail. Your examples are easily recreate in Warrior as written.
If Ewan is out there, he is the king of the scythed chariot, and I would
value his opinion.
Eric Turner
another scythed chariot hater.
"Holder, Scott " wrote:
In some ways, we have precious few data points
to go on.  Here's a very very
quick summary:
401 BC:  Cyrus the Younger wins at Cunaxa.  Xenophon implies
that scythed
chariots were there but no account is given regarding their specific
use if in
fact they were used.  What sounds like *the* public relations
account of
scythed chariots is from a teeny tiny tactical engagement 6 years
later, a
Persian Satrap Pharnabazus used 2 scythed chariots against a 700
man hoplite
block.  The chariots performed as designed, broke up the unit
and the
Pharnabazus mopped it up with LI and cav.  But this engagement
is too small to
have any real meaning to us (or other ancient battlefield commanders)
as to be
nothing more than an almost "demonstration".  Nonetheless,
this little
"demonstration" obviously colored the opinions of generals for
the next 300
years or so.
331 BC: Darius looses the chariots on Alexander at Guagamela (Arbela). 
He
deploys them what we've come to expect, across the center section
of his army
but we don't really have any detail if they were strewn across
they way they
did with elephants or if he had three groupings of chariots, one
center, one
left, and one right, and that these charged in sorta three "massive
blocks".
Most (but not all) modern commentators feel the "massive block"
charge is
correct and that Darius was trying to open up three "lanes" for
his
cav/infantry to follow up.  When Alexander shifted his army
to the Macedonian
right, Darius perceived this as a move to the rough ground to Alex's
right in
order to void the scythed chariot effect.  He then ordered
a cav charge and
then turned loose the chariots (too early).  Needless to say,
Alex beat them
up with LI and then the pike blocks dropped into columns after
the chariots
(probably crewless by that time) were trundling merrily along so
that they
passed thru harmlessly.  This is an easy thing to reproduce
in Warrior.  I
feel that Darius' actions here are telling in our current debate
about how to
treat scythed chariots.  His actions strongly imply that he
"knew" the
chariots weren't gonna work in the rough ground to his left so
made sure they
were let go on the carefully plowed and scraped ground.  This
tells me that he
knew that if troops were in the rough ground, it would be pointless
(at that
point) to charge the chariots, hence his precipitous action. 
This event
colors my judgement on allowing expendables to more or less "ignore"
troops
entirely in terrain they (the expendable) can't enter.
301:  Seleucus apparently had some "leftover" Persian chariots
with him when
the allies ganged up and beat poor ole Antigonus One Eye at Ipsus. 
This is an
infuriating battle to analyze because the accounts are so sketchy. 
All we
know is that Antigonus' son Demetrius, leads the cav off chasing
down the
enemy cav, leaving the infantry behind.  Seleucus, one of
the enemy, then
screened off Demetrius with 200+ elephants.  Antigonus' pike
formations then
stood facing Lysimachus' pike formations while Seleucus ran around
the flanks
with LI and cav, effectively surrounding Antigonus.  It wasn't
until many of
his men surrendered and switched sides, did things fall apart and
the bad guys
charged in to mop up and kill the old general.  Nowhere do
we see any hint of
the chariots being used.  In fact, since it appears that Antigonus'
infantry
position(s) were more or less pinned, it woulda been an ideal time
to roll in
the chariots.  But apparently that didn't happen despite the
fact Seleucus had
100 of them.  So, no help here.  Or perhaps the terrain
wasn't useful.  We
simply don't know.
273 BC:  The Galatians, using captured chariots, turn them
loose against the
Seleucids who somehow managed to "hide" their elephants behind
the infantry.
As the chariots charged in, the Seleucid infantry drop into columns
(ala
Alexander's pike manaeuver at Guagamela), the elephants move forward,
the
chariots slam into the elephants, the chariots rout back into the
massed
Galatian foot, victory for the civilized Hellenes, a minor setback
for the
fanatical Celts.  We don't specifically know how the Galatians
deployed the
chariots but it appeared they were either in massive blocks ala
Darius or
across the army's frontage ala Charonea (see below).  This
battle is called
the "Elephant Victory".
190 BC:  At Magnesia, the Seleucid king Antiochus lost most
of his chariots to
a Roman allied force under Eumenes II of Pergamon before the battle
even
started.  He had deployed them on his left flank, apparently
in an effort to
use them in an enveloping manuever.  Eumenes never gave him
a chance, instead
doing what everybody did to thwart scythed chariots back then: 
send up the LI
to harrass em to death.  Yes the chariots did charge but again,
that was done
earlier than desired and all they fought were the LI.  This
is another battle
that heavily colors my judgement on scythed chariots.  I mean
it appears that
Antiochus deployed them in such a way as to avoid rough terrain
(that was on
the other flank) AND that he massed them to as to punch a big hole
(or roll
up) one flank.  It also infers that the general *did* have
some control over
the things up until the point they charged, then all bets were
off.
86 BC:  The Pontic general (begins with an A) lines up his
chariots in
"classic" across the front fashion.  However, Roman general
Sulla never gives
him a chance to even turn them loose since he comes up to the Pontic
line so
fast, the chariots are only barely given the order to charge and
hence, don't
get to build up a head of steam.  Plutarch's description here
is quite
detailed.  In fact, he recounds how the Roman infantrymen,
after routing some
chariots, would cat call out to the Pontics to send more of em
in so they
could bash them up in turn.  Now you know where the "must
charge 80p in order
to get the scythe bonus" rule comes from.
There's always been a dichotomy with scythed chariots.  With
one exception,
scythed chariots performance in combat wasn't great.  But,
there is no denying
the effect their presence had on an enemy force in that said enemy
force had
to plan accordingly and fight accordingly in order to negate what
was
obviously perceived (rightly or wrongly) to be a very lethal theoretical
threat on the battlefield.  Therein lies the apparent contradiction
on scythed
chariots.  Yeah, we say their performance sucked but I wonder
if it didn't
have more to do with the countermeasures used against them AND
the inherent
limitations (crewmen not fanatically committed to dieing so jump
off) of the
platform.  Undoubtedly everyone "believed" the theoretical
damage these things
could cause which is why I still think an Irr A designation accurately
charactizes them.  At the same time, commanders would appear
to have been
somewhat aware of the grosser limitations of the platform (not
going into
rough terrain for example) and the drivers were still onboard until
a) killed
by some Agranian Javelinman, or b) jumped out after the charge,
and as such,
had a modicum of leeway as to how they were aimed.
Yes, after they've charged, the rules are very clear and if the
chariot plows
into brush, so be it.  Remember, it's now an unguided ancient
missile with a
limited target acquistion capability.  However, prior to that,
it's still
guided by orders (RUSH) but their usage at Guagamela and Magnesia
at least
implies the generals knew about what the chariots *couldn't* do
and there is
no indication that a chariot would have moved up to some brush
with a LI unit
in it and *sat* there waiting for something else to develop.
And if someone wants to be "gamey" by putting a LI unit in some
brush and
waiting for the chariot to trundle by, then pop out and potentially
"freeze"
the chariot in it's tracks, great.  To me, that's not "gamey",
that's good
tactics by the LI player, poor tactics by the chariot player in
not
potentially realizing what could go on vis a vis the terrain and
planning
accordingly.
Whew!  Jon will have the definitive "rules wording" on this
at some point in
time.  At least here you can see my historical outline which
has affected my
*interpretations" on this things over the years.
Scott
List Ho
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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[Ewan McNay]

On Thu, 30 Aug 2001, Eric turner wrote:
> Excellent, the bottom line is good generalship. A tool used correctly is
> effective but one who is rushed or employed it improperly (charging
> elephants) will fail. Your examples are easily recreate in Warrior as
> written. If Ewan is out there, he is the king of the scythed chariot,
> and I would value his opinion.

Now there's a title to cherish .

Advance caveat: my opinions are generally based almost 100% on
playability, 0% on history, which reflects my relative knowledge of the
two areas .

Unless someone's started in the past year while I've been gone, I was
pretty much the only person using scythed chariots in tournaments on a
regular basis, under 7th. I do think that they're underpriced; not
because of their combat effect (which really is pretty easily avoided,
even if deadly when it occurs) but because (i) they're a way of tying up
the opponent's screening troops and (ii) they cause unease.

I would think it reasonable to exempt LI from taking a waver when charged
by these chariots - after all, the LI know that they're eaily handled and
that's part of their specific role. Otherwise, it's an uneasy waver,
followed by another when the LI are broken through (usually the case) -
and hence often scratch one LI unit.

Otherwise, I agree with the reflection of the apparent history in the
terrain rules: if the terrain is dense and/or the opponent has a lot of
lights, the chariots become ineffective.

It does seem that the history does not necessarily reflect the rule of
deploying in front of one's army. For examples:

> > Persian Satrap Pharnabazus used 2 scythed chariots against a 700 man
> > hoplite block.

Maybe not clear-cut, but certainly the lights in front of either army
don't appear to have interfered.

> > right, Darius perceived this as a move to the rough ground to Alex's
> > right in order to void the scythed chariot effect. He then ordered a
> > cav charge and then turned loose the chariots (too early).

Here, the cav are clearly in advance of the chariots, pretty imposble to
achieve under current rules.

> > This event colors my judgement on allowing expendables to more or less
> > "ignore" troops entirely in terrain they (the expendable) can't enter.

I think that this has to be the case; as it is, after the first charge
there's no such out. [My chariots have several times reached the edge of
a wood and been forced by Scott to spend repeated bounds charging the
trees...]

> > 273 BC: The Galatians, using captured chariots, turn them loose
> > against the
> > Seleucids who somehow managed to "hide" their elephants behind the
> > infantry.

Again, the Seleucid skirmishers seem to have been removed *before* the
chariots were used.

And so on..

.. the conclusion seems to be that it's really only terrain that matters,
and that the chariots should perhaps be allowed to move with the main body
of the army until released. Of course, in play terms, that makes them
utterly hideous. It's a question of which is the lesser evil: increasing
point cost or living with ahistorical rules.

[Repeated caveat: this stuff on history is based solely on Scott's
summary, not any expertise of my own!]

> > 190 BC: At Magnesia, the Seleucid king Antiochus lost most of his
> > chariots to a Roman allied force under Eumenes II of Pergamon before
> > the battle even started. He had deployed them on his left flank,
> > apparently in an effort to use them in an enveloping manuever.
> > Eumenes never gave him a chance, instead
> > doing what everybody did to thwart scythed chariots back then: send
> > up the LI to harrass em to death.

Again, here: the chariots are not initially out in front, but are defused
by active opposing LI. This would work if they were on Rush (or even any
form of 'IrrA must charge at first opportunity' which certainly seems
right) but not deployed in advance.

> > up) one flank. It also infers that the general *did* have some
> > control over
> > the things up until the point they charged, then all bets were off.

Agreed. But under current rules, massing the chariots is simply stupid:
it'll result in them all charging the same opposing unit, to little or no
effect. Pretty much the only way one is allowed to use them is in screen
mode - which only accounts for one of the two possible tactics I am seeing
described/used in history here.

> > There's always been a dichotomy with scythed chariots. With one
> > exception,
> > scythed chariots performance in combat wasn't great. But, there is no
> > denying
> > the effect their presence had on an enemy force in that said enemy
> > force had
> > to plan accordingly and fight accordingly in order to negate what was
> > obviously perceived (rightly or wrongly) to be a very lethal
> > theoretical
> > threat on the battlefield. Therein lies the apparent contradiction on
> > scythed
> > chariots. Yeah, we say their performance sucked but I wonder if it
> > didn't
> > have more to do with the countermeasures used against them AND the
> > inherent
> > limitations (crewmen not fanatically committed to dieing so jump off)
> > of the
> > platform. Undoubtedly everyone "believed" the theoretical damage
> > these things
> > could cause which is why I still think an Irr A designation accurately

Sorry for lack of snipping - but basically, I agree, and the causing of
unease is certainly an accurate reflection. Again, though, that should
probably not apply to opposing light troops, especially LI.

Opinions? Opinions we got.

EWan

--- In WarriorRules@y..., Eric turner <etx2@v...> wrote:

> Eric Turner
> another scythed chariot hater.

This calls to mind my first ever game of WRG7th. My first ever combat
dice roll. A Late Imperial Roman scythed chariot slams into my
Nikephorian Byzantine SHC. The SHC survive, if you can call it that.
They say you never forget your first.

The charioteer - none other than scyhted chariot hating Eric Turner.
Times change! Hi Eric.

Wayne Melnick

--- In WarriorRules@y..., "Wayne Melnick" <wayne_melnick@h...> wrote:
> --- In WarriorRules@y..., Eric turner <etx2@v...> wrote:
>
> > Eric Turner
> > another scythed chariot hater.
>
> This calls to mind my first ever game of WRG7th. My first ever
combat
> dice roll. A Late Imperial Roman scythed chariot slams into my
> Nikephorian Byzantine SHC. The SHC survive, if you can call it
that.
> They say you never forget your first.
>
> The charioteer - none other than scyhted chariot hating Eric
Turner.
> Times change! Hi Eric.
>
> Wayne Melnick

Hi Wayne,

Sorry Wayne but we have all experimented in our youth with some type
of controlled substances once or twice. You happened to hit that
phase of my gaming career.

Eric

I'm concerned about giving scythed chariots any more flexibility than I've
believed them to have over the last several years. I've always assumed
they could be "pinned" against bad terrain by troops within. I think Ewan
makes a good point that they are already cheap for what they do, and
giving them more flexibility only further destabilizes the
"price/performance" equation.

A couple of thoughts:

1. I don't see Scott's examples necessarily supporting the claim that
chariots could be tactically redirected prior to charge. The examples just
as easily support the claim that generals had to move them forward to
charge prematurely before the tacticall situation rendered them useless.

2. It seems clear from the examples that light infantry had no particular
fear of scythed chariots.

Not that my opinion counts for much, but I'd recommend that we either:
(a) say that chariots must obey the letter of rush orders, even if that
leaves them inanely pining for a charge at units they cannot reach, or
(b) change rush orders to read "must approach nearest eligible charge
target" rather than nearest enemy, _but_ at the same time remove the waver
test for lights against expendables.

-Mark Stone

    ----- Original Message ----- From: Mark Stone Sent: Sunday, September 09, 2001 2:06 PM To: WarriorRules@yahoogroups.com Subject: Re: [WarriorRules] More on the scythed chariot   I'm concerned about giving scythed chariots any more flexibility than I'vebelieved them to have over the last several years. I've always assumedthey could be "pinned" against bad terrain by troops within. I think Ewanmakes a good point that they are already cheap for what they do, andgiving them more flexibility only further destabilizes the"price/performance" equation.A couple of thoughts:1. I don't see Scott's examples necessarily supporting the claim thatchariots could be tactically redirected prior to charge. The examples justas easily support the claim that generals had to move them forward tocharge prematurely before the tacticall situation rendered them useless.2. It seems clear from the examples that light infantry had no particularfear of scythed chariots.Not that my opinion counts for much, but I'd recommend that we either:(a) say that chariots must obey the letter of rush orders, even if thatleaves them inanely pining for a charge at units they cannot reach, or(b) change rush orders to read "must approach nearest eligible chargetarget" rather than nearest enemy, _but_ at the same time remove the wavertest for lights against expendables.-Mark Stone I agree with Mark on this one. I played the Seleucid lists for years under the old 7.5 et al rules and read whatever I could find about the so called effectiveness of scythed chariots. They were always WAY over rated. I'd suggest that when they have charged impetuously they must go in whatever direction they are pointed in At The End of the first bound. This simulated the difficulty drivers had in controlling direction, the horses being out of control and the driver potentially abandoning the chariot as it suicided on its merry way. Lenney Herrmann------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-->FREE COLLEGE MONEYCLICK HERE to search600,000 scholarships!http://us.click.yahoo.com/47cccB/4m7CAA/ySSFAA/IMSolB/TM---------------------------------------------------------------------~->To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:WarriorRules-unsubscribe@egroups.comYour use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/

[Chris Bump]

Scott,

Your research and examples seem to support the idea that the player who uses
such chariots should have the ability to unleash them when and if he wants.
The mandatory rush orders, I understand the principle behind, but clearly
they were not used in such a manner all of the time. Perhaps an adjustment
to require scythed chariots to be under rush orders if the crew is Irr A
otherwise at the commander's discretion. Until all of your lists are out,
there are multiple lists that only give Irr C as the morale. I do not use
these missles, nor have I ever, but it seems a bit much to give the commander
virtually no control as to when to launch them since they must be placed in
the front of the army and must be under rush orders. Your own research seems
to suggest otherwise.

Chris



In a message dated 08/30/2001 7:53:18 AM Pacific Daylight Time,
Scott.Holder@... writes:

<< In some ways, we have precious few data points to go on. Here's a very
very
quick summary:

401 BC: Cyrus the Younger wins at Cunaxa. Xenophon implies that scythed
chariots were there but no account is given regarding their specific use if
in
fact they were used. What sounds like *the* public relations account of
scythed chariots is from a teeny tiny tactical engagement 6 years later, a
Persian Satrap Pharnabazus used 2 scythed chariots against a 700 man hoplite
block. The chariots performed as designed, broke up the unit and the
Pharnabazus mopped it up with LI and cav. But this engagement is too small
to
have any real meaning to us (or other ancient battlefield commanders) as to
be
nothing more than an almost "demonstration". Nonetheless, this little
"demonstration" obviously colored the opinions of generals for the next 300
years or so.

331 BC: Darius looses the chariots on Alexander at Guagamela (Arbela). He
deploys them what we've come to expect, across the center section of his army
but we don't really have any detail if they were strewn across they way they
did with elephants or if he had three groupings of chariots, one center, one
left, and one right, and that these charged in sorta three "massive blocks".
Most (but not all) modern commentators feel the "massive block" charge is
correct and that Darius was trying to open up three "lanes" for his
cav/infantry to follow up. When Alexander shifted his army to the Macedonian
right, Darius perceived this as a move to the rough ground to Alex's right in
order to void the scythed chariot effect. He then ordered a cav charge and
then turned loose the chariots (too early). Needless to say, Alex beat them
up with LI and then the pike blocks dropped into columns after the chariots
(probably crewless by that time) were trundling merrily along so that they
passed thru harmlessly. This is an easy thing to reproduce in Warrior. I
feel that Darius' actions here are telling in our current debate about how to
treat scythed chariots. His actions strongly imply that he "knew" the
chariots weren't gonna work in the rough ground to his left so made sure they
were let go on the carefully plowed and scraped ground. This tells me that
he
knew that if troops were in the rough ground, it would be pointless (at that
point) to charge the chariots, hence his precipitous action. This event
colors my judgement on allowing expendables to more or less "ignore" troops
entirely in terrain they (the expendable) can't enter.

301: Seleucus apparently had some "leftover" Persian chariots with him when
the allies ganged up and beat poor ole Antigonus One Eye at Ipsus. This is
an
infuriating battle to analyze because the accounts are so sketchy. All we
know is that Antigonus' son Demetrius, leads the cav off chasing down the
enemy cav, leaving the infantry behind. Seleucus, one of the enemy, then
screened off Demetrius with 200+ elephants. Antigonus' pike formations then
stood facing Lysimachus' pike formations while Seleucus ran around the flanks
with LI and cav, effectively surrounding Antigonus. It wasn't until many of
his men surrendered and switched sides, did things fall apart and the bad
guys
charged in to mop up and kill the old general. Nowhere do we see any hint of
the chariots being used. In fact, since it appears that Antigonus' infantry
position(s) were more or less pinned, it woulda been an ideal time to roll in
the chariots. But apparently that didn't happen despite the fact Seleucus
had
100 of them. So, no help here. Or perhaps the terrain wasn't useful. We
simply don't know.

273 BC: The Galatians, using captured chariots, turn them loose against the
Seleucids who somehow managed to "hide" their elephants behind the infantry.
As the chariots charged in, the Seleucid infantry drop into columns (ala
Alexander's pike manaeuver at Guagamela), the elephants move forward, the
chariots slam into the elephants, the chariots rout back into the massed
Galatian foot, victory for the civilized Hellenes, a minor setback for the
fanatical Celts. We don't specifically know how the Galatians deployed the
chariots but it appeared they were either in massive blocks ala Darius or
across the army's frontage ala Charonea (see below). This battle is called
the "Elephant Victory".

190 BC: At Magnesia, the Seleucid king Antiochus lost most of his chariots
to
a Roman allied force under Eumenes II of Pergamon before the battle even
started. He had deployed them on his left flank, apparently in an effort to
use them in an enveloping manuever. Eumenes never gave him a chance, instead
doing what everybody did to thwart scythed chariots back then: send up the
LI
to harrass em to death. Yes the chariots did charge but again, that was done
earlier than desired and all they fought were the LI. This is another battle
that heavily colors my judgement on scythed chariots. I mean it appears that
Antiochus deployed them in such a way as to avoid rough terrain (that was on
the other flank) AND that he massed them to as to punch a big hole (or roll
up) one flank. It also infers that the general *did* have some control over
the things up until the point they charged, then all bets were off.

86 BC: The Pontic general (begins with an A) lines up his chariots in
"classic" across the front fashion. However, Roman general Sulla never gives
him a chance to even turn them loose since he comes up to the Pontic line so
fast, the chariots are only barely given the order to charge and hence, don't
get to build up a head of steam. Plutarch's description here is quite
detailed. In fact, he recounds how the Roman infantrymen, after routing some
chariots, would cat call out to the Pontics to send more of em in so they
could bash them up in turn. Now you know where the "must charge 80p in order
to get the scythe bonus" rule comes from.

There's always been a dichotomy with scythed chariots. With one exception,
scythed chariots performance in combat wasn't great. But, there is no
denying
the effect their presence had on an enemy force in that said enemy force had
to plan accordingly and fight accordingly in order to negate what was
obviously perceived (rightly or wrongly) to be a very lethal theoretical
threat on the battlefield. Therein lies the apparent contradiction on
scythed
chariots. Yeah, we say their performance sucked but I wonder if it didn't
have more to do with the countermeasures used against them AND the inherent
limitations (crewmen not fanatically committed to dieing so jump off) of the
platform. Undoubtedly everyone "believed" the theoretical damage these
things
could cause which is why I still think an Irr A designation accurately
charactizes them. At the same time, commanders would appear to have been
somewhat aware of the grosser limitations of the platform (not going into
rough terrain for example) and the drivers were still onboard until a) killed
by some Agranian Javelinman, or b) jumped out after the charge, and as such,
had a modicum of leeway as to how they were aimed.

Yes, after they've charged, the rules are very clear and if the chariot plows
into brush, so be it. Remember, it's now an unguided ancient missile with a
limited target acquistion capability. However, prior to that, it's still
guided by orders (RUSH) but their usage at Guagamela and Magnesia at least
implies the generals knew about what the chariots *couldn't* do and there is
no indication that a chariot would have moved up to some brush with a LI unit
in it and *sat* there waiting for something else to develop.

And if someone wants to be "gamey" by putting a LI unit in some brush and
waiting for the chariot to trundle by, then pop out and potentially "freeze"
the chariot in it's tracks, great. To me, that's not "gamey", that's good
tactics by the LI player, poor tactics by the chariot player in not
potentially realizing what could go on vis a vis the terrain and planning
accordingly.

Whew! Jon will have the definitive "rules wording" on this at some point in
time. At least here you can see my historical outline which has affected my
*interpretations" on this things over the years.

Scott
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